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?. We begin to think wizen we do not take things at 
their face value, but seek the substantial in them. Then we 
do not merely and immediately respond to them. We stand away 
from them and judge them, distinguishing between the evanescent 
and the permanent in them, so that our response, when it comes, 
may be more delicately adapted to them. We think then we 
judge, and we judge when we use the category of appearance and 
reality. Appearance and reality is coextensive with subject 
and predicate, and subject and predicate is co-extensive with 
thought, even if it is expressed only in such primitive 
interjections as "How hot!", "Rain! ", "Wolff ", where the 
subject is suppressed because, being the appearance, it is 
regarded as of no importance 
At the beginning appearance and reality is merely 
the category used in thought. Later, men seek to promote 
thought by realising more fully what they are about in thinking, 
and tnen this category used in thought is reflected on as an 
object of thought. And then the suggestion is inevitable - 
it comes to be thought that the complete knowledge which is 
the end of thought would be in our power, if we can only 
discover the nature of this reality that we seek in thought. 
When we want to know anything, it is argued, we want to know 
the reality of some appearance - this or that reality. Now 
if/ 
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if we only knew what reality in general is, then without 
further investigation we would know what this or that reality 
is, since all these particular realities are only instances of 
the general reality. And so by that means we could come to 
know the reality of any appearance. 
The thesis of this essay is that the pursuit of a 
reality in general or appearance in general is barren. The 
only reality there can be, it is held, is the reality of this 
or that appearance. There is no reality in general because 
there is no appearance in general. Any reality is real only 
in its relation to a given appearance. Apart from that 
appearance, it may and will be equally well regarded as the 
appearance of another reality. Hence any attempt to establish 
an absolute reality, that is, such a reality as is the reality 
of all appearance and the appearance of no reality, ends in 
self- contradiction. 
The absolute reality, during the greater part of the 
development of European philosophy, has been envisaged as God. 
Even when this has not been so, still the arguments by whicn it 
has been upheld have been borrowed from Christian theology. 
Thus, for example,even when Hegelian absolutism has diverged 
from Christianity, its basis has always been the Christian 
arguments for the existence of God. And the same may be said 
of Spinoza, who, although certainly not a Christian, is yet a 
Scholastic. Thus any examination of the tenability of the 
concept/ 
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concept of an absolute reality must centre round the Christian 
proofs of the existence of God. And since, as it will be 
argued, the final form of these proofs is the Ontological 
argument, it is through a detailed consideration of the thought 
of Anselm - the first and greatest of the exponents of that 
argument - that the thesis of this essay is to be made out. 
2. The relation of appearance and reality is one of 
difference in identity. The appearance is identical with -Lie 
reality so far as it is the appearance of the reality: it is 
different from the reality so far as it is merely its appearance 
and not the reality itself. The ratio between the difference 
and the identity varies in the various uses of the category of 
appearance and reality 
Consider the following cases:- 
i. The appearance of a rainbow added colour to 
the scene. 
The appearance of the sun cheered us up. 
iii. The appearance of the sun affords an indication 
of the weather to be expected. 
She first appeared in London as Peter Pan. 
The character of President Wilson appears in the 
Fourteen Points. 
iv. An oar in water appears to be bent. 
This gives rise to an apparent contradiction. 
The/ 
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The first case is a limiting instance where it is 
difficult to say whether the category of appearance and reality 
is used at all. The sentence may mean merely that a rainbow 
added colour to the scene, and there appearance is equal to 
being and hence cannot be distinguished from reality. On the 
other hand, it might be held that tnereis a distinction implied 
here between the rainbow in general and its various occurences, 
as there is in the second case between the sun and its various 
physical appearances, and then the category of appearance and 
reality would seem to be used. In the second case we are 
clearly inside the limit. We are obviously concerned here 
with a subsistent or continuant, whereas in the first case this 
is open to argument. The reality of the sun is regarded as 
persisting between and behind its various appearances. But 
the difference between the reality and appearance is here at a 
minimum, since no distinction is made between the various 
appearances of the reality. Reality is distinguished from 
appearance only negatively - as what is or is not hindered from 
appearing by atmospheric conditions - and the reality is not 
regarded as changing wnen it appears. In tne third case, the 
appearance is distinguished from the reality positively as well 
as negatively. It is no merely the absence of hindrances 
(the clouds), which is implied in the appearance of the sun, but 
the sun itself is positively changed in appearing, add this is 
evidenced/ 
evidenced by the fact that its appearances are different under 
different conditions. This may be regarded as the normal use 
of the category. In the fourth case the difference between 
appearance and reality is envisaged as opposition, or even as 
contradiction. The actual appéarance is contrasted with the 
reality. behind the appearance, and sa we come to say that 
appearances are not to be trusted. 
The difference between appearance and reality implies 
circumstances under which the reality appears. The various 
degrees of difference are paralleled by the various degrees of 
effectiveness in which the circumstances combine with the reality 
to produce the appearance. In the second case, the circumstances 
have only a negative influence -. the clouds do not prevent the 
sun appearing. In the third case the atmospheric conditions 
are regarded as affecting the appearance of the sun. As they 
are different, so is the appearance different, and thus from 
its appearance we infer the atmospheric conditions under which 
it appears. Similarly in the other two examples of the third 
case, the reality is regarded as entering into a system of 
relations (in one case those involved in the production of a 
play, and in the other those present between the various nations 
up to and during the War), which both allows the reality to 
express itself, and at the same time dictates the manner of this 
expression. To a certain extent the system may be accommodated 
to/ 
to the demands of any factor which enters into it, but it only 
accommodates itself so far as that particular factor accepts its 
demands in general. It is, then, not merely the actress that 
accounts for the appearance of Peter Pan, nor is it merely 
President Wilson that accounts for the appearance of the Fourteen 
Points. The actress requires the play (and all that that 
implies), the producer, the other members of the company, the 
theatre, and so on. President Wilson requires the whole of 
European history so far as that issued in the War. 
This point, namely that it is not merely one reality 
that is involved in an appearance, but rather that reality in 
co-operation with other realities, comes out with greatest 
clearness in the fourth case. This is distinguished from the 
third only by the circumstance that the reality in appearing 
appears with the character which in some sense is the opposite 
of that which it has as real. Thus the oar appears as bent, 
while it really is straight. The chain of reasoning issues in 
a proposition which appears as self-contradictory, while really 
it is self consistent. This may happen also in the third case, 
but the difference between the third and the fourth cases is 
that in the latter the characteristics in which appearance and 
reality differ are regarded as essential. We approach the upper 
limit of the ratio of difference and identity in appearaace and 
reality/ 
reality; where the identity seems on the point of being swamped in 
difference. Here, obviously, if the fact that is taken to be 
the reality of the appearance is still.to be regarded as its 
reality, a very real disturbing influence must be allowed for. 
If the reality is to be saved as the reality of this appearance, 
it cannot be the only reality involved. Thus the appearance of 
bentness in the oar placed in water must be recognised as arising 
from the interaction of the straight oar and the behaviour of 
light waves in water. And so far as the facts in isolation go, 
it would seem immaterial whether we regard the reality of the 
bent oar as the light waves and the straight oar merely as 
an accompanying circumstance,or vice versa. 
There is thus a latent contradiction in the reference 
of any fact as appearance to another fact as its reality. That 
reality is not the reality of the appearance. It is merely one 
of the realities which together have brought about tune appearance. 
This does not commonly matter, since it is not the whole of 
reality that is wanted. It is taken for granted that there is 
more in the appearance than is accounted for by the reality to 
which it is referred. But that is selected merely as the 
relevant reality, and the other realities are disregarded as 
irrelevant. 
But when the attempt is made co find the unique 
reality of all appearances, this latent contradiction in the 
reference of appearance to reality must break out. Then there 
is/ 
is no place for the relevant and the irrelevant. We cannot 
believe that besides the reality to which we are referring 
appearances, there is another reality which co-operates with the 
first in producing the appearances, but which we may for the 
moment disregard. The very statement of our purpose precludes 
this: we are seeking the unique reality of appearances. But 
nevertheless, in spite of the fact that we cannot allow for 
another reality working with our unique reality to produce 
appearances, it will be found that another reality is assumed. 
Any reference of an appearance to a reality refers to other 
realities in conjunction with which the appearance is produced, 
and it is impossible to suppress this reference. 
The reality cannot of itself account for its appearance, 
unless the appearance is simply identical with the reality. And 
then all that is obtained is an identical proposition. If 
there is a difference between appearance and reality, then a 
second reality must be brought in to account for the difference. 
If there is no second, reality, then no reason can be given why 
the first reality issues in an appearance different from it. 
Bu--t it is impossible to deny the legitimacy of an appeal for 
such a reason. And thus if it is insisted that one, and only 
one, reality completely accounts for an appearance, we are faced 
with an enquiry whica we can neither deny nor satisfy. 
It may be replied that, while the second, reality which 
accounts/ 
accounts for the difference between the original reality and the 
given appearance, may not be identical with the original 
reality, yet nevertheless it need not be other than that 
reality. It may be a part or attribute or function of treat 
reality which occasions it to appear, and then that part or 
attribute or function of the reality will be all that is 
necessary to account for the difference between the appearance 
and the reality. Thus it would seem that nothing besides that 
reality is involved, in the sense that nothing outside is 
involved. (For example, 'Socrates was mortal because he was 
a man' means 'The death or Socrates is the appearance of the 
reality of Socrates so far as he was a man.'). 
But if the second reality is regarded as only a part 
or attribute or function of the original, then it cannot be said 
to account for the given appearance. The whole of parts or 
attributes or functions cannot interact with any one of its 
parts or attributes or functions. As a whole it is all its 
parts or attributes or functions in inueraction. If, then, 
you take one of these parts or attributes or functions separately 
and consider its behaviour in isolation, you have broken up 
your original whole and substituted another for it, namely the 
original whole minus the part you are separately considering. . 
The parts of a whole can interact with one another so that the 
whole is changed, or the whole can interact with other wholes so 
that its parts are changed. But the whole canno6 interact with 
any/ 
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any one of its parts. It can only be the whole minus the 
part, which interacts with that part. And thus the contention 
that nothing outside one reality is needed to account for a 
given appearance breaks down. 
It is probable, however, that in any actual instances 
of this sort that could be alleged, it would be found that the 
part of the whole which, it is said, causes the whole to appear, 
is not merely a part of that whole. It is probable that the 
part initiates an appearance only in connection with another 
reality outside the whole of which it is a part, and tnen, w 
is obvious, a second reality is admitted as necessary for the 
original reality to appear, and the reduction which has just 
been given will not be needed. (This is the case with the 
death of Socrates. Socrates did not die merely because he 
was a man. He died because the human body which was his 
interacted with the hemlock which he drank.) 
3. Thus in any reference of an appearance to a reality, 
another reality is always implied, and hence any such reference 
must always pre -suppose more than it states. However far the 
statement goes, it can always go further. However many middle 
terms are inserted, more can be inserted. We always work 
within a system, and however wide our judgment, the system is 
always wider. We never reach the point where system and 
judgment/ 
judgment coincide - in Scholastic language, essence and existence 
are never identical. The attainment of such an identification 
involves a contradiction, not merely for our thought, but for 
thought in general, that is, a contradiction in. fact.. This 
contradiction follows on the two undeniable postulates of thought; 
(7) There must be difference between any appearance and the 
reality that is predicated of it, and (2) This a. fference must 
be accounted for since there is identity between the appearance 
and the reality. The first postulate necessitates a difference 
between the appearance and the reality; the second forbids as 
to take this difference as final. Any judgment, treat is to 
say, must be able to expand. But it cannot expand if it is 
the whole system, since then there would be nothing beyond it. 
It can expand only on the presupposition of another reality 
outside it. This is the position of any reference of 
appearance to reality (any judgment); and hence it is inferred 
an absolute reality is untenable, not because our faculties are 
insufficient to attain it, but because there is no such thing. 
An absolute reality must be different from (transcend) its 
appearances, since otherwise (if it is wholly immanent) it is 
a mere duplication of its appearances. But its difference 
from its appearances implies another reality as a circumstance 
conditioning its appearances, and thus controverts its claim 
to be absolute. 
It/ 
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It may be objected that if this sketch is a true 
account of the category os appearance and reality, then not 
only does it follow that there is no absolute reality of all 
appearances, but also that there is no reality of any appearance. 
This denial of an absolute reality, it will be said has over- 
reached itself. In attempting to dispose of an absolute 
reality, it has also disposed of any reality, and thus it has 
contradicted itself in denying that category which, at the 
beginning, was asserted to be co- extensive with knowledge. 
If the reference Of an appearance to its reality always 
involves an endless process, as it does on this theory, then 
there can be no reference of any appearance to its reality. 
This endless process is not of the same kind as that involved, 
for example, in the number series, where aithougn we may go as 
far as we like, we may also stop wherever we like and use the 
numbers we have so far reached, in perfect confidence that our 
failure to complete the series will not disturb our manipulation 
of these numbers. According to this account of the category of- 
appearance and reality, on the other hand, the completion of an 
endless process is demanded. by any use that is made of the 
category. If we stop short anywhere, we have failed to 
demonstrate our right to the category, in leaving behind us an 
its 
unresolved difference between the appearance and /reality. But 
we must stop somewhere, and it follows therefore that no use of 
this/ 
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this category can be made. And thus knowledge is impossible. 
The line to be taken in answering this objection. has 
already been indicated. In claiming that anything is the 
reality of appearance, we are claiming falsely. But outside 
religion and philosophy this claim is not made. A Qualification 
has to be and is understood, namely that this is the reality of 
this appearance in a certain direction and up to a certain point. 
As it was previously put, the reality asserted is only the 
relevant reality, and not the reality in general. Of course, 
it cannot be asserted off -hand that this and only this is the 
relevant reality to any appearance, and that consequently we 
need only go so far and no further in the determination of that 
reality. The determination of relevance, jaz relevance, in 
such a fashion would assert an absolue reality in the very 
face of its denial. But that is not implied here. The 
assertion that the determination of the reality of an 
appearance up to a certain point (for example, the determination 
of ßiÍ to six places of decimals) is alone relevant is an 
assumption not given in the appearance itself, nor yet inferred 
from the absolute reality of that appearance. It is an 
hypothesis suggested by the context of fact in relation to which 
the reality of an appearance is to be determined, and its truth 
is to be decided by its success or failure in enabling us to 
deal with the apearance in that context of fact as we want to 
deal .with it. While, then, we may proceed with the 
determination 
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determination of the reality of an appearance so far as we wish, 
yet there is no necessity for us to go beyond any given 
determination. It is true that if, on stopping anywhere, we 
assert that the reality we have reached is simply the reality 
of the appearance, then that assertion is false. But there is 
no reason why such an assumption. should be made, and to avoid it 
we need only note as a qualification the point to which we have 
carried the determination of the reality. We may advance 
beyond any point in our determination of reality, and in certain 
contexts we must advance beyond any given point. But it does 
not therefore follow that we must advance bajond any point. 
Thus the completion of an endless process is not necessitated 
in the use of the category of appearance and reality. And thus 
the category is saved, so long as it is used only relatively, 
wnen it is recognised that the reality which has contributed to 
an appearance is a reality within a certain context. The 
typical case is that of scientific measurement, where we always 
measure to a certain degree of accuracy. 
4. An absolute reality is such that (1) there is 
no other reality besides it, since otherwise it would be relative 
to that reality, and (2) there is no appearance which is not 
its appearance, since, then, either that would be itself another 
reality, or it would be the appearance of another reality. 
Thus/ 
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Thus an absolute reality is the unique reality of all appearances, 
and there cannot be any element of difference between the 
appearances and their reality, since any difference would imply 
another reality besides it. The appearances must be completely 
accounted for by the reality, since there cannot be anything in 
them which cannot be referred to this reality. But then, fail- 
ing a difference between the appearances and this reality, the 
appearances simply collapse into the reality, and the category 
of appearance and reality disappears. The reality simply 
the appearances. This consequence follows inevitably on the 
denial of a context within which appearance and reality are 
located, and this denial of a context is given in the very idea 
of an absolute reality. It is only through the fringe of fact 
outside any appearance and reality that the appearance and 
reality are both held together and held apart, that is, related 
as appearance and reality. Failing a context, the facts will 
simply coalesce. You will not get the identity in difference 
which alone enables the one to be regarded as the relation of 
the other; you will only get abstract identity. 
It may be objected: All that this shows is that it 
is impossible to obtain an absolute reality in the sense in which 
the term reality has a correlate in the term appearance. And 
thus the contradiction discovered in the concept of an absolute 
reality is simply a contradiction that has been put into it. 
It/ 
It amounts to this: Any reality is relative at least to its 
own appearances, and thus no reality can be absolute, since it 
always has a correlative in its appearances. Now, it is Quite 
obvious that if reality has been defined as relative, then it 
cannot be absolute. But need reality be defined as relative? 
What hinders it indeed, from being understood as 'being'? It 
is taken for granted that the reduction of the concept of 
absolute reality to 'being' is the end of the matter, but it 
may very well be rather its beginning. Here the issue cannot be 
pre -- judged by definitions and here it seems obvious that there is 
a case for the absolute. It will not, indeed, be an absolute 
which enables us to distinguish between degrees of being. 
But it does give us a firm and final foundation for our 
dealings with the world, which the shifting distinctions and 
identities of appearance and reality do not give. Thus, 
granting that in the attempt to attain an absolute reality the 
category of reality as relative to appearance inevitably loses 
itself in the category of being, yet this may be accepted as an 
elucidation of the nature of an absolute reality, rather than 
as its reduction to absurdity. We have certainly got rid of 
the category of reality in the narrower sense (that is, as 
relative to appearance), but we have retained it in the wider 
sense (that is, as 'being' vixlich is not relative to anything), 
and our grip on it is all the firmer for this elucidation. 
In seeking an absolute reality, what we are looking for is 
really/ 
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really what is, as distinct from what is not. We wish-to be 
able to differentiate real being from sham being. We do not 
wish to differentiate lesser being (appearance) from greater'. 
being (reality). This is all that we want, and this is what 
we have ootained. 
The answer to the first part of this objection is 
that reality is always correlated with appearance. The answer 
to the second part is that it is impossible to avoid this 
correlution. 
It is true that the contradiction that has been found 
in the concept of an absolute reality is to be traced back to 
the original correlation of reality with appearance. But that 
correlation has not been put into the concept of reality; it 
has been found there. The real, as it is commonly understood, 
is correlated with the apparent, and this correlation extends 
into philosophy. On the other hand, it must of course be 
granted that philosophical issues are not to be decided by 
linguistic usage, and thus the attempt to save the concept of 
an absolute reality by dropping the correlation with appearance, 
must be judged solely by its ability to account for the facts. 
It cannot be ruled out on the ground that it is using terms in 
an uncommon way, even though that may cause us to suspect that 
it has something to conceal. 
Though the correlation of appearance with relaity 
may/ 
may, at the beginning, be denied, yet it must, in the end, be 
asserted. It is impossible to rest in an abstract being which 
is pure identity, since with pure identity only identical 
propositions can be obtained, (X is' or 'X has being' meaning, 
'X is XI). As soon as you attempt to get beyond identical 
propositions (to obtain 'X is Y') you have introduced difference 
within your identity. And it is this difference alone which 
makes it worth while to assert the identity. The lumping 
together of everything which is, as the absolute reality, does 
not even enable you to differentiate sham being from real being. 
This Being is the being of Nothing. 
Pure being (abstract identity) is self-destructive. 
It always leads beyond itself into the being which involves 
difference in identity. But this being (which, as distinct 
or determinate 
from pure or abstract being, may be called concrete/being) is 
simply reality understood as relative to appearance. It is 
judgment regarded as the copula, that is, as the integration 
of the terms of judgment, while tne reality and appearance are 
the terms of judgment in their integration. Thus any attempt 
to substitute pure being for appearance and reality must end in 
the re-emergence of appearance and reality, since the assertion 
of pure being inevitably leads to the assertion of concrete 
being, and thus to the re-assertion of appearance and reality. 
In attempting to establish an absolute reality, it is impossible 
to/ 
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to throw over reality in the narrower sense (as relative to 
appearance) for being which is not relative to anything, since, 
by that means, you simply re- introduce it. The narrower sense 
of reality is its only sense, and thus the reduction of an 
absolute reality and its appearances to pure being is a reduction 
to absurdity, since it is a reduction that cannot be acquiesced 
in. Reality and appearance must somehow emerge again from 
pure being. 
5. The attempt to obtain an absolute reality of 
appearances leads to the absolute identification of what was 
regarded as the reality with what was regarded as its appearances. 
But this identification cannot be acquiesced in. Some 
difference must somehow be imported in order that the 
distinction of appearance and reality may be re- asserted. 
Now tnis distinction cannot be obtained through the identity 
by which the advance from appearance to absolute reality was 
mediated. But, it may be suggested, it can be obtained 
besides that identity. In a sense it is true that there is 
nothing beyond absolute reality, but in another sense, it is 
not true. There must be nothing beyond the absolute reality in 
the sense that that absolute reality must be quite unrestrained 
and unrestrainable. But so long as that is obtained, there 
may be something beyond it, not in any absolute sense, that is, 
not / 
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not as it itself is, but in some derivative sense, that is, 
as its appearances are - as the creatures of the creator. 
The contradiction that rias been found in the conceptcf an 
absolute reality has sprung from a too abstract view of being. 
It has been assumed that the appearance is, just as the reality 
is. And yet, it is plain, the appearance is not as the reality 
12. It is the equivocal position of appearance staggering from 
being to not-- being that has enabled it to be asserted that there 
can be no ultimate reality, on the ground that an ultimate 
reality both must and cannot have appearances outside itself. 
But if, now, it is recognised that there are degrees of being, 
that the appearance js, even while it is not as, the reali±4L, 
then it may be recognised that, while in a sense appearance is 
internal to the reality, in another sense it is external. It 
all depends on what is meant by 'is'. If what is meant is 
'is absolutely', then the appearance is wholly within reality, 
since there is nothing beyond absolute reality. But if 'is to 
some extent less than absolutely' is meant, then the appearance 
is to that extent outside reality. And at the limit where 'is' 
means bare existence, then appearance and reality are spread 
out side by side as if there were no difference between their 
existences. 
The real problem of a cosmological argument (that is, 
of a proof of an absolute reality through its appearances) then, 
consists/ 
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consists in the attempt to differentiate two senses of 'being', 
so that, on the one hand, there is nothing beyond the absolute 
reality, and, on the ocher hand, its appearances are beyond the 
absolute reality. The conclusions which have been stated 
in the previous paragraphs may be accepted, but they are only 
half the truth. Besides the nisus between appearance and 
reality which leads to their identification, there is another 
which holds them apart. Besides absolute being, there are 
degrees of being. It is only if we consider the one in 
isolation from the other that we appear to reduce the concept 
of an absolute reality to absurdity. If we take tree other 
along with it, then we save it from this absurdity. Thus any 
cosmological proof will contain two arguments. One will 
advance from appearances to reality, taking the appearances up 
into the reality. The other will advance from appearances to 
reality, leaving the appearances outside reality. This is 
the cosmological argument of Anselm (1). 
The necessity of this statement of the cosmological 
argument has been obscured because of the currency 01 the 
traditional statement derived from Aristotle as d fixed. by 
Thomas. And it has been obscured because the real problem of 
the cosmological argument is not faced in this statement. 
Thomas/ 
(1) Monologium, Cap. III and IV. 
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Thomas did, of course, assert a distinction between the being 
of God and the being of His creatures on the basis of Aristotle's 
doctrine of analogical predication (1). But that distinction 
is not used in his proofs of the existence of God, where it is 
needed, and thus these proofs fail (2). 
It is a legitimate criticism of the proofs of God 
from motion and causation that, beginning with a postulation 
of an infinite series, they end in deilying the infinity at that 
series. But that criticism does not get down to the real 
objection to the arguments regarded as proofs of an ultimate 
reality. The real objection to these arguments is not that 
they are not based on a finite series (whether of movers and 
moved, or of causes and effects), but that they are based on 
a series. Whether or not it stops, the linear series that 
Thomas/ 
(1) See, for example, Summa contra Gentiles, 
Cap. XXXII to XXXIV. 
(2) A doctrine of degrees of being is used in his 
fourth argument for the existence oÿ God. (Summa m ntra 
750 Gentiles, Cap. III: Summa Theologica,î,Quaest 2, Art.3). 
But that does not save him from the charge that he 
neglects his own doctrine of analogical predication 
in establishing the existence of God. His proofs are 
present -ed in isolation - one is as good as another, 
and any one can stand even if all the others fall. 
But if he had seen what was involved in his doctrine 
of analogical being, he would have had to state the 
fourth proof as the necessary complement to any of 
the others. 
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Thomas is dealing with cannot take him to the reality that he 
considered God to be. When you start from anything and then 
pass to another thing that is connected with it in some way, 
and then on to a third that is similarly connected with the 
second, and so on, you are not getting progressively nearer 
to the reality of the first thing. . On the contrary, you are 
getting further away from it. You approach nearer to tihe 
reality of a thing by filling in the context within which any- 
thing influences that thing, not by neglecting that context and 
advancing beyond it to another isolated influence of the first 
influence. The extent to which you obtain the reality of the 
first thing will not be deuermined by the length to which you 
go in tracing bac2k influence along a single line, but by the 
extent to which you isolate and relate the converging lines 
of influence which meet in the thing. Thus, the further you 
trace back a linear series, the less will the term of that 
series at which you stop (if you can stop) be the reality of 
the initial term - the more you have neglected the context 
within which any two members of that series are related. 
Thus, even granting that internally the cosmological 
proofs of Thomas are cogent, yet these proofs must still be 
helä to fail in so far as the reality they reach fails to take 
account of the whole of the things of this world which are 
regarded/ 
-24- 
regarded as its appearance. They fail to do this initially, 
since the movement of a thing or that aspect oz it whereby it 
is regarded as having been efficiently caused, is not the 
whole of the thing, and this failure is aggravaed the 
further they go. More and more even of that part of the 
appearance which was originally accounted for must be left 
out of account as the series of movers and moved, or of efficient 
causes and effects, progresses. 
Thus in the Thomist cosmological argument, the 
problem of an absolute reality does not appear as the 
problem of reconciling the identity of the reality and its 
appearances (that is, the fact that only Goa really is) with 
the difference of the reality and its appearances (that is, 
the fact that both God and His creation are), because the 
problem of an ultimate reality was never realised by Thomas. 
6.. Any cosmological argument which is to do justice to 
this problem, and so avoid the ignoratio elenchi of Thomas, 
must then involve two arguments: 
(a) An argument which proceeds to God from the things 
of this world by taking up their being into God, This 
argument postulates a relation of dependence of one thing 
upon another, and ultimately on God, which is so completely 
thorough -going that nothing of the dependent thing is left 
outside/ 
outside than on which it depends. It is only so that God can 
be understood as the reality which alone is through itself, 
and through which all things are (1). 
(b) An argument which proceeds to God from the things other 
than God by an ascending scale of degrees of being. This does 
not/ 
(1) This is Anselm's statement:- "Denique non solum omnia 
bona per idem aliould sunt bona, et omnia magna per idem 
aliquid suret magna; sed quidquid est, per unum aliquid 
videtur esse. Omne namque quad. est, aut est per aliquid, 
aut per nihil; sed nihil est per nihil. Non enim vel 
covitari potest ut sit aliquid non per aliquid. Quidquid 
igitur est, non nisi per aliquid est. Quod cum ita sit, 
au -t est unum, aut sunt plura, per quae sunt cuneta quae 
sunt. Sed si sunt plura, aut ipsa referuntur ad unum 
aliquid, per quod sunt; aut eadem plura singula sont per 
se; aut ipsa per se invicem aunt. At si plura ipsa sunt per 
unum, jam non sont omnia per plura; sed potius per illud 
unum, per quod haec plura sunt. Si vero ipsa plura 
singula suret per se, ùtique est una aliqua vis vel natura 
existendi per se, qua habent ut per se sint. Non est 
autem dubium quod per idipsum unum sint per quod habent ut 
sint per se. Verius ergo per ipsum unum cuneta aunt, ouam 
per plura, quae sine eo uno esse non possunt: ut vero plura 
per se invicem sint, nulla p4titur ratio; quoniam ir.-ration- 
alis cogitatio est UT alic[ua es sit per illud cui dat esse: 
nain nec ipsa relativa sic sunt per se invicem. Nam cum 
dominus et servus referantur ad invicem, et ipsi homines qui 
referuntur, omnino non sunt per invicem; et ipsae relationes 
quibus referuntur, non omnino sunt per se invicem, quia 
eaedem suret per subjecta. Gum igue veritas omnímodo 
excludat plura esse, per quae cuneta sunt, necesse est unum 
illud esse, per quod aunt cuneta quae sont. Quoniam ergo 
cuneta quae sunt, sunt per ipsum unum; procul dubio et ipsum 
unum est per seipsum. Quaecunque igitur alfa suret, suret 
per aliud et ipsum solum per seipsum. At quidquid est per 
aliad, minus est quam illud per quod cuneta sunt alla, et 
quad solum est per se. Quare illud quod est per se, maxime 
omnium est. Est igitur usum aliquid, quod solum maxime et 
summe omnium est: quod autem maxime omnium est, et per quod 
est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, et omnino quidquid aliquid 
est/ 
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not involve a relation of dependence from one state to another, 
and so here the things from which the ascent to God is effec,ted 
are left outside Him. It is by this approach that God is saved 
from vanishing into the thin smoke of pure identity to whicn the 
first argument leads, since it has provided a measure of 
difference between the absolute reality and its appearances 
which counterbalances the identity of the first argument (1). 
If/ 
est, necesse est esse summe bonum, et summe magnum, et summum 
omnium quae mint. Quare est aliquid quod sive essentia, 
sive substantia, sive natura dicatur, optimum et maximum est, 
et summum omnium quae sunt." (Monologium, Cap. III). As 
may be inferred from the reference at he beginning of this 
chapter, this argument is preceded by Olio others which 
establish the existence of (i) that which is good through 
itself and through wnich all good things are good (Cap.I). 
(ii) that which is great through iuself and through which 
all great things are great (Cap.III). Thus Anselm's 
cosmological proof consists of four approaches to God, and 
not merely of two as I have stated. I have ignored the 
first two, since it seems obvious that their only function 
is to prepare for the third (as may be seen from its opening), 
and that when once the third is suated, they become merely 
particular instances of it. That through which, all things 
are what they are is necessarily that through which good 
things are good and great things are great. 
(1) Si Tuts intendat rerum naturas, velit, nolit, sentit 
non eas omnes contineri una dignicatis paritate; sed quasdam 
earum distingui graduum imparitate. Qui enim dubitat quod 
in natura sua ligno melior sic equus, et equo praestantior 
homo, is profecto non est dicendus homo. Cum igitur 
naturarum aliae aliis negari non possint meliores, nihil 
ominus persuadet ratio aliquam in eis sic supereminere, ut non 
habeat se superiorem. Si enim hujusmodi graduum distinctio 
sic est infinita, ut nullus sit ibi gradus superior, quo 
superior alias non inveniatur; ad hoc ratio deducitur, ut 
ipsarum/ 
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If a cosmological proof is to succeed, these two 
arguments must be held together and yet apart. Neither must 
be allowed to affect the other, and et they must lie side by 
side to remedy each other's deficiencies. The absolute being 
of/ 
ipsarum multitudo naturarum nullo fine claudatur. Hoc 
auteur nemo non putat absurdum, nisi qui nimis est absurdus. 
Est igitur ex necessitate aliqua natura, quae sic est 
alicui vel aliquibus superior, et nulla sit cui ordinetur 
inferior. Haec vero natura quae talis est, aut sola est, 
aut plures hujusmodi et aequales sont: verum si plures sunt 
et aequales, cum aequales esse non possint, per diversa 
quaedam, sed per idem aliquid, illud unum, per quod aequaliter 
tam. magnae sunt, aut est idipsum quod ipsae suret, id est, 
ipsa rerum essentia, aut aliud quam quod ipsee sont . Sed 
si nihil est aliud quam ipsa earum essentia, sicut earum 
essentiae non sunt plures, sed una; ita et naturae non sont 
plures, sed una. Idem namque naturam hic intelligo, quod 
essentiam. Si vero id, per quod plures ipsae naturae tam 
magnae suret, aliud est quam quod ipsae sont, pro certo minores 
sunt, quam id per quod magnae suret. 'Quidquid enim per aliud 
est magnum,.minus est quam id per quo& est magnum. Quare non 
suret sic magnae, ut íllis nihil aliud sit majus. Quod si nec 
per hoc quod sunt, nec per aliud possible est tales esse 
plures natural, quibus nihil sit praestantius; nullo modo 
possunt esse naturae plures hujusmodi. Restai igitur unam 
et solam naturam aliquam esse, quae sic est aljiis superior, 
ut nulli sit inferior; sed quad tale est, maximum et optimum 
est omnium quae sont. Est igitur quaedam natura, quae est 
summum omnium quae sunt. Hoc autem esse non potest, nisi 
ipsa sit per se id quod est; et cuncta quae sum, sint per 
ipsam id quod sunt. Nam cum paulo ante ratio docuerit id 
quod per se est, et per quod alia. cuncta sunt, esse summum 
omnium existentium; aut e converso id quod est summum, est 
per se, et cuncta alla per illud; aut erunt plura summa. Sed 
plura summa non esse manifestum est. Quare est quaedam natura, 
vel substantia, vel essentia, quae est per se bona et magna, 
et per se est id quod est, et per quam est quidquid vere aut 
bonum, aut magnum, aut aliquid est, et quae est summum bonum, 
summum magnum, summum ens sive subsistens, id est, summum 
omnium quae sunt." (Monologium, Cap. IV.) 
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of the first must not be infected by the relative being oI the 
second, and the relative being oz the second must not be 
infected by the absolute being being of the first. Being must 
be both absolute and relative, so that cae creatures of God may 
both be wholly within Him and yet to some extent without Him. 
If one demand is insisted on to the exclusion of the other, 
then either you get pure identity between God and His creatures, 
or else the identity is prejudiced to such an extent that God 
cannot be regarded as the creator of His creatures. The first 
argument gives the identity of appearance and reality; the 
second gives the difference, and neither without the other is 
of any use. 
But unless these arguments are related at the beginning, 
they cannot be held together at the end. The reL,t.on of 
appearance and reality is than of diiference .1n, identity, not 
of difference plus identity. It is not a matter of first 
finding an abstract identity, then an abstract difference, and 
then adding them together. Identity and difference wnich are 
obtained independently will not complement each other. If 
they have any bearing on eacn other at all, they will destroy 
each other. In order that difference may be asserted with an 
identity, difference must be asserted in the very assertion of 
the identity. The identity is suce that the difference would 
not/ 
not be what it is if the identify were not what it is. But 
this can be obtained only when a judgment is asserted within a 
context, that is, when the reality to which an appearance is 
referred is not its only reality, but one of a number of realities 
which together appear. It is because the oar which is bent in 
water is the identical oar which is straight out of water that 
there is a difference between its straightness out of water, and 
its bentness in water. But it is because the real oar is not 
an isolated thing but functions along with other things, that 
you can get identity in difference between the real oar and the 
apparent oar which complement each other and do not destroy each 
other. It is,notably,because of the behaviour of light waves 
that the oar can be both straight and bent, and bent because t 
is straight, and straight because it is bent. But when you 
are engaged in proving a unique reality, you are forced to obtain 
the difference in identity of reality and appearance separately, 
and then the difference and the identity will fall apart so that 
the reality destroys itself. 
In the first argument you advance from appearances to 
their unique reality by postulating the complete dependence a 
any appearance on something beyond it, and then arguing that as 
this dependence is common to every appearance, therefore it is 
a dependence of all appearances on one reality. Thus you get 
to/ 
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to God on this argument by assuming that, as they are derivative, 
all the things of this world equally are, or rather equally are 
not. Difference of being in this argument is not a difference 
already present between the various terms of the premises, but 
a difference that holds only between the terms of the premises 
taken as a whole and the conclusion. It is a result of the 
demonstration of the complete dependence of the things of this 
world on God. So far as the things of this world are 
different so far their dependence on God is incomplete, for, 
then, the whole of their being will not be taken up into God, 
but only the part which is common to them. This argument, then, 
depends on the absolute identity of the being of the things of 
this world, and it is destroyed by any differences of their being. 
But differences between the being of thins is the 
initial postulate of the second argument. It argues that as 
there are differences of being among things, and as these 
different beings cannot form an endless series, therefore God 
must be admitted as that which is in the greatest degree (1). 
And thus the second argument must either destroy the first a* 
be abandonned in favour of the first. It is impossible to have 
it/ 
(1) It is unnecessary to attack the second assumption 
which tuis argument has in common with Thomas'. Unless 
a final term of a series of degrees or being is assumed 
in its very definition, it seems impossible ever to demonsrate 
it. But that point need not be laboured here. All that we 
are concerned with here is the consistency of the two 
arguments and not the validity of either taken separately. 
it both ways. God cannot be both the limit of an ascending 
series of different beings, aid also that on which each and 
every member of the series, and thus the whole series, depends. 
In order to identify the conclusions reached in the two arguments, 
it will be necessary to say that God, as the only independent on 
which everything depends, is also God as that which is to the 
greatest extent, because degrees of independence are degrees of 
being, since being varies inversely with dependence. And then, 
in order to assert difference of being between God. and His 
creatures, you will have to prove ttie dependence of the creatures 
on God. Then either of two conclusions will follow: Either 
you can deny differences of being among the things of this 
world so that you can reassert the first argument, kr you can 
assert the differences of being among the things of this world, 
so that you can re- assert the second argument. But it is 
impossible to assert both arguments together, since it is 
impossible to say that the things of this world are dependent 
only on God and, at the same time, that there are differences 
of being among the things of this world; since if God" as the 
only independent, is also to be regarded as that which is to 
the greatest extent, differences of being must be regarded as 
differences of independence. 
Either the difference of being postulated in the 
second argument goes so deeply into the n.-,ture of things that 
the/ 
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the first argument fails to hold through the destruction of 
the being common to all of them, or, if that is not so, the 
second argument is simply a re- statement of the first. It 
pre -supposes things to be divided into those which are through 
another and therefore inferior, and that which is through itself 
and therefore superior, and it then simply re- asserts the 
existence of something which is inferior to nothings on the 
ground of the existence of something which alone is through 
itself. In the case of Anselm, it is the second alternative 
that is chosen. The first argument is pushed home and she 
second argument is abandonxed. And in this Anselm is typical 
of the whole Scholastic period which begins with him. Here, 
at the very beginning, the same position is reached that is 
afterwards reached at the very end in Spinoza (1). We are 
thus back at the position reached in Paragraph 4. The attempt 
to obtain a difference between appearance and reality has 
failed, as it must always fail whenever an absolute reality is 
in question. If you insist on the absoluteness of your 
reality, you must deny that it is distinguishable from appearances 
and thus you must deny that it is reality at all. 
(1) Compare Monologium, Cap. XXVIII: e... Ille solus 
creator spiritus est, et omnia creata, non surit; nec tarnen 
omnino non sont, quia per ilium qui solus absolute est, de 
nihilo aliquid facta sunti' and Ethices, Pars. I, Trop. 15: 
iTQuidquid est in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque 
concip.i potest.° 
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7. The breakdown of Anseim's cosmological proof 
follows on the principles that have already been elujated, 
but the actual point at which the breakdown occurs reveals a 
development of these principles which is worth considering in 
detail. 
Spinoza's dictum: 'All negation is determination' 
is only half the truth. Negation is determination, because 
judgment in general is determination; because affirmation, too, 
is determination. In passing from affirmation to negation, you 
are not passing from indeterminateness to determinateness (the 
limitation of indeterminateness). If you were, no passage from 
affirmation to negation would be possible, since determinateness 
can be obtained only from determinateness. The transition 
from affirmation to negation is possible because all judgment 
asserts difference as well as identity. It is possible because 
subject and predicate are both held together and held apart by 
the copula. If this second factor in the copula is overlooked 
so that judgment is regarded as pure identification, then 
negation must be regarded as an absurdity, since it denies 
identification (though always on some basis Of identity). 
The theory of negative judgment is thus a critical 
point with any logic, not because negation introduces any new 
factors into judgment, but because it makes prominent those 
factors which in affirmation tend to be obscured. The ability 
to/ 
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to account for negative judgment is a test of the extent to 
which affirmative judgment has really been accounted for. Thus 
it is that Anselm's difficulties with his cosmological argument 
centre round the position to be assigned to noc -being (1). In 
considering affirmation, he has been exclusively concerned with 
the identity (being) that it asserts, and hence when he attempts 
to get difference (not--being) out of it, he is lost. The 
dependence which Anselm has obtained for all appearances on the 
absolute reality is absolute. The relation 'through, with which 
he is working,is not the correlative of any other relation or 
relations of dependence - 'from', 'by', 'in'. It is rather 
the relation of dependence which contains all relations of 
dependence. Hence it follows (2) that, just as all things 
which are, are through the supreme nature, and that alone is 
through itself, so all things are from that nature, and that 
alone is from itself. And hence, again, (3) it follows that it 
is in all things as well as through all things, and that it is 
that in which all things are, as well as that through which all 
things are. And so finally (4) it follows that it becomes all 
things. 
(1) Monologium, Cap. VI, XII, XIII and XIX. 
(2) Ibid, Cap. V. 
(3) Ibid, Cap. XIV. 
(4) Ibid, Cap. XXV, quoted in footnote to previous paragraph. 
? t/I- 
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But this development does not go forward without 
some opposition from Anselm. He finds himself unable to 
acquiesce in this disappearance of all other relations in the 
relation 'through', even though that disappearance is necessitated 
by the position assigned to 'through' in his original proof. 
Thus (1) he attempts, on the basis of the second argument, to 
check theme development of the first argument towards Spinozism, 
and he therefore denies the result that he has reached immediately 
before (2). Those things1which are through the hi Wiest nature, 
he argues, cannot be from it, since then the highest nature Vill 
be the matter (matexi ) of things, and so it will be changed by 
increase or decrease as the things which are through it come to 
be, or pass away. But it cannot be supposed that the highest 
nature is subject to change, and still less, if that be possible, 
can it be supposed., as this suggestion would imply, that it 
changes it self. Thus, therefore, those things whicu are through 
the highest nature are not from it (3). 
(1) Monologium, Cap. VII. (2) Ibid. Cap. V. 
(3) At si ex summae naturae materia potest esse aliquid 
minus ipsa, summum bonum mutari et corrompi potest: quod 
nefas est dicere. Quapropter, quoniam omne quod aliud est 
quam ipsa, minus est ipsa; impossibile est aliquid hoe modo 
esse ex ipsa. Amplius: dubium non est quia nilllatenus est 
bonum, per quod mutatur vel corrumpitur summum bonum. Quod 
si qua, minor natura est ex summi boni materia, cum nihil sit 
undecunque nisi per summam essentiam, mutatur et corrumpitur 
sumum bonum per ipsam: quare summa essentia, quae est ipsum 
summum bonum, nullatenus est bonum; quod est inconveriiens 
Nulla igitur minor natura materialitux est ex summa natura. 
(Ibid, Cap. VII). \' 
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But if not from the highest nature, from what are 
they? They cannot be from themselves, since nothing is from 
itself.. And even if they could be and were, they would tnen 
be through themselves, which is false. But there is nothing 
beyond the highest nature and those things which are through 
the highest nature. They must therefore be from nothing, since 
everything is either from something or from nothing (1). 
This argument is necessitated at all points by the 
purpose Anselm has in hand. He cannot allow that trie relation 
'through, by which he has advanced from appearances to the 
absolute reality, is merely one relation of dependence among 
others, since that would leave his absolute reality less than 
absolute. He cannot, in particular, regard it as accounting 
merely for the "form" of things, leaving the "matter" out of 
account, since that would lead to two absolutes - absolute 
matter from which all things are, and absolute form through 
which/ 
(1) Cum igitur eorum essentiam, quae per aliud scat, 
constet non esse velut ex materia, ex summa essentia, nec 
ex se, nec ex allo, manifestum est quia ex nulla materia est. 
Quare, quoniam quidquid est per summam essentiam est, nec 
per ipsam aliquid aliud esse potest nisi ea aut faciente aut 
materia existente, consequitur de necessitate, ut praeter eam 
nihil sit, nisi ea faciente, et quoniam nihil aliud est vel 
fuit, nisi illa, et quae facta sent ab illa, nihil omnino 
Tacere potuit per aliud, vel instrumentum, vel adjumentum, 
quam per seipsam. At omne quod fecit, sine dubio aut fecit 
ex aliquo, velut ex materia; aut ex nihilo. Quoniam igitur 
certissime patet quia essentia omnium, quae praeter summam 
essentiam sent, ab eadem summa essentia facta est, et quia ex 
nulla materia est; procul dubio nihil apertius qum quia 
multitudinem, tam formose formatam' tam ordinate varia.t,m, tam 
convenienter diversam, sola per seipsam produxit ex nihl.lo.(Ibic 
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which all things. are. Thus he must somehow dispose ot- the 
correlative concepts of form and matter in order that he may 
assert the absolute concept of creation. The relation 'through' 
with which he is working must, then, be regarded as accounting 
for very much more than the formal element, of things. But yet 
it cannot be regarded as accounting for the form plus the matter, 
since that leads towards the absolute identification of tue 
absolute reality and its appearances, which, as he here sees, is 
fatal, but which, as has been noted, he is afterwards driven to 
assert. 
What then, is he to do with 'from' as representing the 
concept of matter (correlative of form), which he is trying to 
dispose of? He cannot deny that it has some validity - he 
recognises, for example, that it is useful and necessary to 
regard all things as from the four elements (1). He cannot 
refer it back to the derivative things titmselves, so that they 
may be their own matter, since that would give them a degree of 
self / 
(1) Non autem dubito omnem hanc mundi molem, cum partibus 
suis, sicut videmus, formatam constare ex terra et aqua et 
aere et ignea quae, scilicet, quatuor elementa, aliquo modo 
intelligi possunv sine his formic quas conspicimus in rebus 
f/ormatis, ut eorum informiscorporum suis formic discretorum; 
non inquam,hoc dubito; sed quaero, onde haec ipsa, quam dixi, 
mundanae molis materia. sit. Nam si hujus materiae est 
cliqua materia, illa verius est corporeae universitatis 
materia. (Ibid.) 
- - 1.. 44114.Éy 
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self -subsistence which would prejudice the absoluteness of the 
highest nature. He is then driven to attempt to make this 
relation 'from' innocuous by referring it to Nothing. Matter 
is Nothing. 
But this solution, he finds, (1) is no solution. If 
something is from Nothing, Nothing itself was the cause of that 
which is 'from' it. But how does that which has no being help 
tp-o bring anything inuo being? And if Nothing cannot be the 
condition of anything, how is something effected by Nothing? 
Again, Nothing either issomething or it is not, but if it is, 
tnen, whatever is from Nothing is from something. And it it is 
not, then, only Nothing is from it, and thus it would follow that 
are 
the Nothing from which the things of this world /must be something, 
and thus the whole of the preceding argument is overthrown (2): 
In/ 
(1) Ibid, Cap. VIII. 
(2) Sed oecurit quaedam dubitatio de nihilo. Nam ex 
quocunque fit aliquid, id causa est ejus quod ex se fit, et 
omnis causa neeesse est aliquod ad essentiam effecti praebeat 
adjumentum. Quod sic omnes tenent experimento, ut etiam nulli 
rapiatur contendendo, et vix ulli subripiatur decipiendo. Si 
ergo factum est ex nihilo aliquid, ipsum nihil fuit causa ejus, 
quod ex ipso factum est. Sed quomodo id quod nullum habebat 
esse, adjuvit aliquid ut perveniret ad esse ? ut Si autem nullum 
adjumentum de nihilo provenit ad aliquid, cuïlqualiter 
persuadeatur quia ex nihilo aliquid efficiatur? Praeterea, 
nihil aut significat aliquid, aut non significat aliquid. Sed 
si nihil est aliquid, quaecunque facta sunt ex nihilo, facta 
sont/ 
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In order to escape these difficulties, Anselm 
interprets the proposition: 'Those things which are through 
the highest nature are from Nothing', as, 'Those things which 
are througn the highest nature are not from anything'. (1) 
But this is just what he cannon do. This second 
formula, so far from being a re- formulation of the first, is a 
completely new one which either contradicts the first, or goes 
back to the position from which the first was developed: 
In this re- formation either 'anything' includes Nothing, 
or it does not. If it does, then, among other things, it 
asserts that those things which are through the highest nature 
+-'are not from Nothing. If it does not, then all that it asserts 
is that those things which are through the highest nature are 
neit -her from themselves nor from the highest nature. And it 
was/ 
sunt ex aliquo. Si vero nihil non est aliquid: quoniam 
intelligi non potest ut ex eo quod penitus non est, fiat 
aliquid, nihil fit ex nihilo; sicut vox omnium est quia nihil 
de nihilo. Unde videtur consequi ut quidquid fit, fiat ex 
aliquo: aut enim fit de aliquo, aut de nihilo, Sive igitur 
nihil sit aliquid, sive nihil non sit aliquid; consequi 
videtur ut quidquid factum est, factum sit ex aliquo. 
(Ibid. Cap.VIII). 
(2) Tertia interpretatio, qua dicitur aliquid esse factum 
de nihilo, est cum intelligimus esse quidem factum, sed non 
esse aliquid, onde sit factum. Per similem significationem 
dici videtur, cum homo contristatus sine causa, dicitur 
contristatus de nihilo. Secundum igitur haec sensum si 
intelligatur, quod supra conclusum est, quia praeter summam 
essentiam cuneta, quae sunt ab eadem, ex nihilo facta sunt, 
id est, non ex aliquo: sicut ipsa conclusio praecedentia 
convenienter consequetur, ita ex eadem conclusione nihil 
inconveniens subsequetur. (Ibid.) 
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:;as from this statement that the problem that the problem of 
the disposal or 'from' arose. Either, then, the new formula 
contradicts the old, or it re- states the old problem. 
But it is not only in relation to the previous 
development of the argument that the equivocal position of 
Nothing leads to difficulties. Whether or not account is taken 
of the consistency of the argument, the pothletion of Nothing 
raises difficulties which will prevent the disposal of 'from' 
by reference to it. The root of the trouble is that Nothing 
must both. be and not be, and this, on Anselm's premises, is 
impossible. Nothing is more than mere absence, but it is less 
than the absolute reality and its appearances. It is thus 
impossible to regard Nothing along with the absolute reality. 
and its appearances as ]_being', and it is equally impossible to 
distinguish it from them as 'not being'. And hence it is 
impossible to obtain the perfectly general term - 'anything' 
since it is impossible to determine the relation of Nothing to 
it. Nothing can neither be included in nor excluded from 
'anything'. 
In order to obtain the term 'anything' you must then 
deny Nothing. You must assert that the absolute reality and 
its appearances are all that there is. It is only then that 
you can get the general denial that appearances are from 'any- 
thing' on the ground that they are neither from themselves nor 
from/ 
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from the absolute reality, and 'anything' precisely denotes the 
absolute reality and its appearances. But if you recognise 
Nothing outside the absolute reality and its appearances, you 
cannot assert that the appearances are not from anything. 
But "is not anything" implies "is something else". In 
spite of any attempts to make "is" absolute, it will turn round 
in your hands and become relative. And this necessitates the 
re-emergence of Nothing in face of all denials. Affirmation 
and negation are correlatives. This does nob mean that 
negation must be based on affirmation in the sense that 
affirmation is self-subsistent, while negation is not. The 
justification is mutual, just as negation is to some extent 
self-subsistent, but is further justified by affirmation, so 
affirmation is to some extent self-subsistent and is further 
justified by negation. The real point is tnat when any 
predicate is denied of any subject, it may be legitimately 
asked: What then can be asserted of the subject? The table 
is notscluare: what then is its shape? Similarly, in the case 
where a relation and not a simple attribute is concerned. This 
ring is not made of gold: what then is it made of? Thus: 
Appearances are not from anything: what then are they from? 
And the only possible answer is, Nothing. 
Negation always pre-supposes a set of alternatives 
so that lei. one of the alternatives is denied, it is assumed that 
the/ 
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the other may take its place. Thus, in attempting to get rid 
of the correlatives of form and matter,.Anselm has introduced 
the correlatives of being and not - being. The root of not -being 
is to be found in his first argument for God. There, it was 
argued that since anything is what it is through something else, 
therefore the being of appearances pre- supposes an absolute 
being through which they are what they are. But in precisely 
similar fashion it may be argued that anything is not,what IL 
is not, through something else, and therefore the not -being of 
appearances (what they lack) pre- supposes an absolute no-t -being 
through which they are not what they are not. Thus Nothing is 
with as much righ -t, and indeed with the same right, as God 
Himself. It is impossible, then, to get rid of Nothing, The 
necessity of its emergence is rooted in the very nature of the 
attempt to establish an absolute reality. 
It may be objected that although we always assume 
that there is an affirmation correlative to any negation, yet 
such a correlative may not be logically demanded. There is no 
need to go from 'appearances are not from anything' to 
'appearances are from Nothing', because that would imply that 
we did recognise that appearances are from something, and that, 
in fact, we have denied. The assertion that appearances are 
not from anything is really a denial of the relation 'from' 
altogether./ 
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altogether. It might be put: 'From' in relation to 
appearances, is not. And then to ask in the face of this 
assertion: what then are appearances from? is a question 
which cannot legitimately be put. It certainly cannot be 
answered. But that is no proof that the assertion is 
unjustifiable. It is rather an indication that the question 
is absurd, since while it pretends to proceed on the basis of 
the assertion, it really proceeds on the basis of the denial of 
the assertion. 
It may be agreed that if the formula, 'Appearances 
are not from anything' cannot be re-formulated as, 'From in 
relation to appearances is not', then the emergence of Nothing 
is not necessitated. But this re-formulation is not possibls. 
It would mean that the relation 'from' must altogether in every 
sense be denied.of appearances. And it is impossible to 
abolish terms in this way. You will then be affirming that 
they are mere words - vocal sound or inked colour. Terms may 
not be what they pretend to be, but even their unjustified 
pretension must connect itself at some point with what is, 
and thus they will ithemselves obtain some sort of covering of 
being. The absolute denial of 'from' that would save Anselm 
from Nothing, is not open to him. In recognising that in some 
sense, however slight, the appearances of the absolute reality 
are from the four elements, he has made it impossible to assert 
that / 
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that 'from' altogether is not. And the recognition that 
appearances are in some sense 'from' is a recognition that he 
is forded to. Thus, any absolute denial of 'from' is 
impossible. All denial is relative and hence the demand for 
an affirmation correlative to any negation is justified. And 
since this is so, Nothing must arise as that from which the 
appearances of the absolute reality are, and it cannot 
subsequently be got rid of. 
Thus Anseim's attempt to obtain the transcendence of 
his absolute reality splits on Nothing. If he will not regard 
appearances as being from the absolute reality as well as 
through it, then he must regard them as being from Nothing. 
But the Nothing from which they are, must be a Nothing which is 
something, and thus he will have admitited something beside the 
absolute reality and its appearances, so that the absolute 
reality will cease to be the unique reality of appearances, and 
hence will cease to be absolute. It follows, then, that it is 
impossible for an absolute reality to transcend its appearances. 
Such reality as the appearances have, and that is the whole of 
the appearances, is the reality which they have in the absolute 
reality, and that is the reality of the absolute reality. And 
this is the conclusion to which Anselm himself is ultimately 
driven. The appearances, then, are the absolute ,y reality, and 
conversely, the absolte reality is the appearances,` and nothing 
but the appearances. The distinction between appearances and 
reality/ 
-45- 
reality has vanished and you are left with a reality which is 
simply identical with the appearances. 
The difference between the absolute reality and its 
appearances which is provided by the second argument, cannot 
assert itself against the identity which is the aim of the 
first argument, and therefore the cosmological proof, which 
consists of the one and the other utterly destroys itself. 
Thus the considerations advanced against any cosmological 
argument on the basis of the naL,ure of the concepts of 
appearance and reality have been vindicated in the development 
of Anselm's cosmological argument, which is of the form that 
any cosmological argument must take, if the reality to be 
obtained from it is absolute. 
8. "Postquam opusculum quoddam (Monologion), velut 
exemplum meditandi de ratione fidel, cogentibus me precibus 
quor -umdam fratrum, in persona alicujus tacite secum 
ratiocinando quae nesciat investigantis elidi: considerans 
illud esse multorum concatenatione context= argumentorum, 
coepi mecum quaerere si forte posset inv neri unum argumentum, 
quod nullo alio ad se probandum, Quam se solo indigeret; et 
solum ad astruendum quia Deus vere est, et quia est summum 
bonum nullo alio indigens, et quo omnia indigent ut sint et 
bene sint; et quaecunque credimus de divina substantia, 
sufficeret." (Anselm, Proslogion, Prooemium). 
The criticism that has been passed on the concept 
of an absolute reality has all along been based on the 
supposition that that concept is asserted in judgment. Pre- 
supposing/ 
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supposing this, it has been argued that judgment is unequal 
to the assertion of an absolute reality, since judgment is the 
assertion of identity in difference, whereas the appearances 
of an absolute reality, cannot be different from it, since, if 
they were, the absolute reality would not be the only reality 
of its appearances and would not therefore be absolute. This 
criticism is open to attack in two directions: - 
i. On the ground that an absolute reality may be 
without being able to be asserted to be. 
ii. On the ground that judgment, is not co-extensive 
with knowledge. 
The, first of these objections may be soon disposed 01. The 
second introduces the ontological argument whose consideration 
will occupy the remainder of this essay. 
i. That is, is independently of its being known to be, 
and thus it is impossible to deny an absolute reality merely on 
the ground that it cannot be asserted to be. Even if it 
cannot be asserted to be, nevertheless it still may be (1). 
This objection supposes that the reality of an 
appearance is merely another fact beside and beyond the appear- 
ance. But this is not so. The reality of an appearance is 
what/ 
(1) This objection would probably be supported by a 
theory of the limitation of human knowledge on the ground 
(in the last resort) that men are minds in bodies. But 
it is unnecessary to state any such justification for 
this objection. It is complete as it stands and is 
probably far more cogent without the help of a theory of 
knowledge. 
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what stands in a certain relation to the appearance - it is 
what accounts for the appearance. Thus the possibility of an 
absolute reality does not rest merely on the possibility of 
there being other facts beyond the facts that we know, but on 
the possibility of the facts that we know being accounted for 
by a unique reality. And this, it has been seen, is impossible. 
Doubtless there are many things of which men collectively, as 
well as individually, are ignorant. But such a general ignorance 
of things does not justify the assertion that any determinate 
thing is possible, if the demands of that thing in relation to 
other things cannot be met. 
iî. The first objection to the denial of the absolute, 
on the ground that judgment is inadequate to its assertion, 
denies that the impossibility of knowing anything implies its 
actual impossibility. The second objection allows that the 
impossibility of knowing anything implies its actual impossibility 
but denies that judgment is co- extensive with knowledge. It 
will allow that the criticism that has been passed on the 
concept of an absolute reality is valid so fax as the absolute 
reality has been asserted in judgment. But it will not allow 
that that criticism is final, since it denies that judgment is 
final. It affirms that the inconsistencies in the concept of 
the absolute reality that we frame through judgment may be over- 
come when we pass beyond judgment. The concept of an absolute 
reality/ 
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reality, it says, has been found untenable because it has been 
approached from something other than itself. - because the only 
proof of it that has been considered is the cosmological proof. 
Now this impossibility of advancing from anything outside the 
absolute reality to the absolute reality may be granted. But 
that does not show that it is impossible to obtain an absolute 
reality. The cosmological argument is not the only road to God. 
Beyond it is the ontological argument, which, in avoiding the 
transition from appearance to reality, advances beyond judgment 
and hence eludes the contradiction which the cosmological 
argument is bound to assert - that appearances both are and are 
not the absolute reality. 
The ontological argument does not advance from 
something outside the absolute reality to the absolute reality, 
but neveiaeless it does advance. It is an advance within the 
absolute reality and it is a development of tue absolute reality. 
Thus, although no other term than the absolute reality itself is 
involved, that is not to say that at the end we are left exactly 
where we were at the beginning. It is true that we start with 
the absolute reality in order to reach it, but the reality 
which we reach is not the reality with which we began. We are 
not dealing with the static circumscribed terms of formal logic 
which remain fixed in petrified immobility. 
And again, we have passed beyond the sphere of judgment 
where/ 
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where any concretion of a term can appear only as an addition 
to it, so than it is distinguished from it even while it is 
identified with it. In the ontological argument the absolute 
reality that we reach at the end is more than the absolute 
reality that we had at the beginning, but that`more "does not 
accrue to it through judgment. Of itself it develops itself, 
and it asserts its actuality even in the face of its denial. 
It asserts itself not through any force which it borrows from 
its context, but through the force which it contains in itself. 
"Tantam enim vim hujus probationis in se continet significatio; 
ut hoc ipsum quod dicatur, ¡i.e. quo majus cogitari non possitJ 
ex necessitate, eo ipso quod intelligitur vel cogitatur, et 
revera probetur existere, et idipsum esse quidquid de divina 
substantia oportet credere." (1) 
The precarious foothold that we have in knowledge 
through judgment passes beyond itself if we carry it far 
enough. It is only so long as we, in knowing, are outside 
the object which is known, that our knowledge is bifurcated 
into subject and predicate, appearance and reality. The 
externality of subject and predicate is the externality of 
subject and object. But this externality of subject and 
object continues only as long as the subject is not equal to 
the object. As knowledge grows more and more adequate, the 
distinction/ 
(1) Anselm, Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilonem, Cap. X. 
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distinction between subject and object grows more and more thin. 
And_ ult- imately, when we have reached the point at which our 
knowledge is altogether adequate, when we have grasped reality 
as absolute, then it breaks down - subjecu passes into object, 
and therefore into predicate. It is when subject passes into 
object, so that judgment negates itself, that we reach the 
absolute reality, and it is this very passage from the absolute 
reality into the absolute reality that alone can constitute the 
proof of the absolute reality (1). 
9. The absolute is the self -sufficient, and the self- 
sufficient can be shown to be only through itself. Since it 
is not through anything else, it cannot be shown to be through 
anything else: since it is through itself, it can and must of 
itself assert itself. The ontological argument is thus not, one 
of a ninmber of possible proofs of the existence of the absolute. 
It / 
(1) This statement of the purpose of the ontological 
argument goes far beyond. anything Anselm con.cemplated, in 
introducing it in terms of the Hegelian logic. (See, for 
example, The Logic of Hegel (trans. Wallace) pp. 325-334; 
Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God in Lectures 
on the Philosophy of Religion (trans. Speirs and. Sanderson) 
Vol. 3). But I do not think that Anselm's account is 
thereby falsified, since, I believe, Hegel's statement of 
AnselmTs argument is the statement .Anselm himself would 
have had to give of it if he had still maintained it in 
the nineteenth century. That, at any rate, is what is 
being maintained here. 
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It is the proof of the absolute, and hence it is more than a 
proof of the absolute. It is not an argument whose failure 
leaves the possibility of an absolute where it was before. It 
is an argument whose success or failure immediately and directly 
decides whether or not there is an absolute. It is a crucial 
experiment. If an absolute really is, it must be known to be 
through itself: if it cannot be known to be through itself, 
then it is not. (1). Thus a grounded belief in the absolute 
is not compatible with a rejection of the ontological argument. 
It may be objected to this that while an absolute 
reality must be self -sufficient, yet it does not therefore follow 
that its existence can be proved only through its self -sufficiency 
We, may know that it is, without knowing in detail what it is, 
so that we cannot prove that it is through what it is. Thus, 
lit may be said that the belief in an absolute reality is not 
incompatible with a rejection of the ontological argument. The 
fact that we cannot argue to an absolute reality on the basis of 
its self -sufficiency does not tell against its existence, but 
rather against our limited human faculties. Nor, in rejecting 
the ontological argument, are we bound to reject any other 
argument for an absolute reality, since, again,we can know that 
a thing is without knowing completely what it is. 
There! 
(1) "Id quod in se est" necessarily is, "id quod per se 
concipitur ".. Spinoza's definition is tautologous. 
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There are two variants of this position which are 
historically important: that of Thomas and that of Kant. 
They agree in regarding the ontological argument as sound in 
principle, but yet as beyond the reach of man, and their grounds 
for this are identical - the restriction of human knowledge to 
the objects of the senses. But they disagree in the alternative 
which they propose to the ontological argument. For Thomas the 
alternative is a cosmological argument: for Kant it is the 
demand of morality for the moral government of the world. 
But in both cases the admission of an alternative to the 
ontological argument is incompatible with the attitude that is 
adopted towards the ontological argument. In the case of 
Thomas the assertion of the alternative is incompatible with 
the rejection, for human knowledge, of the ontological argument. 
In the case of Kant, the assertion of the alternative is 
incompatible with the assertion in principle (as an ideal) of 
the ontological argument. And one or other of these conflicts 
is bound to occur whenever an absolute reality is asserted along 
wit- h a denial of its assertion through its absoluteness. 
Either the absolute reality or the denial of its assertion 
through its absoluteness must go. If the absolute is held to, 
then the argument for it, that is asserted as an alternative to 
the ontological argument, will itself turn out to be an ontological 
argument. If, on the other hand, what is asserted as an 
alternative to the ontological argument really is an alternative, 
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then it will not be an absolute reality that is arrived at by 
its means. 
(a) Thomas: In God, being and essence are identical, 
since He is necessarily through Himself (1) and He is His own 
essence (2). Therefore God Himself is His being, and thus 
that He is, is known der se simplicitgr. But it does not 
therefore follow that He can be so known gpad nos, since we 
cannot conceive what He is. Thus, fur example, although it 
is known Ber se, sj.mpliciter that any whole is greater than its 
part, yet to him who does not conceive the meaning of 'whole', 
it must be unknown. Similarly, in relation to the most evident 
(notissima) things, our understanding is as the sun to the owl 
(3). A thing is known to the extent that its substance is 
comprehended. Thus if the human intellect comprehends the 
substance of anything (for example, a stone or a triangle), 
nothing that may be understood of that thing escapes the faculty 
of human reason. But this is not the case with God. The 
human understanding cannot attain to a comprehension of the 
substance of God by its own power, since in this life thought 
arises from sense, and so those things which do not occur in 
sense/ 
(1) Summa contra Gentiles, 
Summa Theologica, Quae 
(2) Summa contra Gentiles, 






st. III, Art. 4. 
Lib.I Cap.XXI; 
st. III, Art. 3. 
Lib.I, Cap.XI; 
st. II, Art. 1. 
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sense cannot be comprehended by human understanding, except in 
so far as thought of them may be interred from the senses. But 
sensibles cannot lead our understanding to see in them what the 
divine substance is, since they are effects unequal to the power 
of their cause. Nevertheless, our understanding is led from 
sensibles to the divine knowledge, so that it knows of God 'Mat 
He is, and other things which must be attributed to the fir st 
principle (1) . 
The cogency of Thomas' attempt to differentiate the 
ontological argumeht, which he believes himself unable to assert, 
from the cosmological argument, which he does assert, depends 
on his ability to differentiate the effects of God from the 
substance of God. It is because God is to some extent in His 
effects, but yet not completely, that he can regard the 
consideration of God's effects as both affording the knowledge 
that He is, and at the same time denying the knowledge of what 
He is. But it is impossible to draw any sharp and final 
distinction between the effects of God and God Himself. If 
there is any distinction at all, it must be merely provisional 
and temporary, and no argumeni from the effects of God to God 
is/ 
(1) Summa contra Gentiles, Lib. I, Cap. III. This is 
treated in greater detail in the Summa Theologica 
(Quaest. XII), where the sharp conclusions of the Summa 
contra Gentiles are somewhat softened by the use of a 
number of distinctions. But the outcome is identical - see particularly Art.11. 
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is complete until it has been overcome. Thus, when the 
argument fzom the effects of God is pushed home, it is bound 
to become an ontological argument, since it is only when the 
effects of God are realised as God Himself that God can be 
regarded as absolute. 
The sensibles,which are regarded as the effects of 
Godlcan be regarded. as His effects only to the extent that 
there is such knowledge of Him as will enable us to assert Him 
as their cause. In order that we may argue from effects, we 
must have gone beyond effects. We cannot even say that anything 
is an effect unless we have demonstrated its continuity with 
something else which we may therefore regard as its cause. 
And the continuity which we must assert between one fact and 
another fact, in order that one may be regarded as the cause 
of the other, is not a bare contiguity. The continuity of 
cause and effect can be asserted only on the basis of content. 
Thus in arguing to God from movement, He can be regarded as 
the First Cause only in being regarded as the Unmoved Mover. 
An argument from effects, then, must be regarded as also an 
argument from substance, since the search for a cause is a 
search for what can bring about the effect. 
But in the case of the First Cause, this continuity 
between cause and effect reduces to identity, since there is 
nothing/ 
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nothing outside the First Cause which can hold its effects 
away from it. The First Cause of itself completely accounts 
for its effects; it must be at the same time final, formal, 
material and efficient cause of all tnings. Therefore the 
effects of the First Cause cannot be other than the First Cause. 
Since God is that which is necessarily through Himself, 
and therefore His essence and His existence are the same (1), 
is follows that He cannot be except in His essence. There can 
be no accident in God, since God is existence itself, and 
existence cannot participate in anything (2). But if God had 
effects unequal to Him, He would be without His essence, since 
these effects would involve His existence, but not His essence. 
These effects would be accidental to Him, since they would pre- 
suppose something beyond Him, through which they were added to 
Him. But this is impossible, and therefore God cannot have 
effects unequal to their cause. 
Either God has no effects, or these effects are 
not -hinr but His essence. And thus either the cosmological 
argument, which is asserted as an alternative to the ontological, 
fails altogether, or it reduces to the ontological argument. 
(1) Summa contra Gentiles, Lib. I, Cap. XXII. 
Summa Th- eologica, Quaest. III, Art. 4. 
(2) Summa contra Gentiles, Lib. I, Cap. XXIII. 
Summa Theologica, Quaest. III, Art. 6. 
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(b) Kant,. The concept of God in the first instance 
is the idea of a necessary being which is the basis of contingent 
being, and, the proof of the existence of the object of this 
concept consists in the attempt to specify it. This can be 
done only through its identification with the ideal of the 
completely conditioned, which, being the synthesis of all . 
possible conditions, is incapable of any condition. Thus, any 
theoretical proof of the existence of God reduces to an 
identification of the idea of necessary existence with the ideal 
of the completely conditioned. And so the ontological argument, 
which seeks to prove that the completely conditioned necessarily 
exists (though it reverses the natural order of reason), is the 
basis of both the other arguments which speculative reason uses 
to prove the existence of God - the cosmological and the 
physico- theological. 
But the ontological argument breaks down because the 
concepts which are used in it, are noc objective constitutive 
principles of reason, but subjective regulative principles of k: 
reason. They do not form concepts of objects, but merely 
arrange the objects which the understanding has received through 
sensibility, and so they can be used only immanently and not 
transcendently. And this shows itself to be the case in the 
fact that, while speculative reason is- obliged to think that 




Since, then, the concepts of reason may be used 
only immanently, it follows that all synthetic knowledge .a 
lriori is impossible outside the confirmation of possible 
experience. But the synthesis of the ontological argument 
cannot be confirmed by experience, since only the contingent 
and the conditioned are found there, while it is dealing with 
the necessary and the completely real. Thus the ontological 
argument fails, and its failure involves the failure of the 
other speculative proofs of the existence of God. 
But although the ontological argument fails, and with 
it the other speculative proofs of the existence of God, it does 
not therefore follow that God does not exist. Rather the very 
fact that it is impossible to prove the existence of God 
theoretically shows that it is equally impossible to disprove 
His existence theoretically. The failure of speculative reason 
to prove God's existence is rooted in the restriction of human 
experience, and this restriction makes it as impossible to deny, 
as to assert, God. 
Thus, in spite of the failure of the ontological 
argument two prove the necessary existence of the completely 
real, that still remains flawless as an ideal, which may be 
ot- herwise proved to exist, not by reason used speculatively, 
but/ 
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but by reason used practically. In practice we are in touch 
with noumena, since we ourselves are noumena, whereas in theory 
we are in touch only with phenomena. And taus the demands of 
practical reason come in to supplement the possibility of the 
ideal of speculative reason. Hence, despite the failure of 
the ontological argument, the object of that argument must be 
attained since the moral law demands a moral government of the 
world, and the demands of the moral law must be satisfied (1). 
On the one hand, then, the failure of speculative 
reason to carry through the ontological argument, owing to the 
restriction of human knowledge, leaves us with the concept of 
God as a flawless ideal which we must both assert and deny. 
On the other hand, the demands of practical reason, which, 
unlike those of speculative reason, must be completely satisfied, 
force us to regard this ideal as actual. But the realisation 
of the existence of God which we obtain in practice, does not 
react on our knowledge of His existence which we seek to obtain 
in theory. Even while we know through practical reason that God 
must be, He still remains an unrealisable ideal for speculative 
reason. 
There is a gap between speculative and practical reason 
which/ 
(1) Critique of Pure Reason: Transcendental Dialectic, 
Book II, Chap. III (The Ideal of Pure Reason). 
Critique of Practical Reason: Part First, Book II, 
(Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason). 
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which neither can occupy, since in doing so it would encroach 
on the other. And so there is a gap between our knowledge of 
God as an ideal and our postulation of God as an actuality, 
which can never be filled in. Kant must assert this gap, 
if he is both to deny the cogency of the ontological argument 
and yet, at the same time, to assert the existence of God. 
If the argument from morality is to be a genuine alternative to 
the ontological argument, a rigid distinction must be drawn 
between practical and speculative reason, since otherwise what 
is asserted as an alternative to the ontological argument will 
turn out, as it did in the case of Thomas, to be merely 
subsidiary to the ontological argument. Failing a gap between 
practical and speculative reason, the existence of God which 
we assert in practical reason would have to be shown as 
continuous with the ideal of God which we assert in speculative 
reason. And, then, the restriction of knowledge which made it 
possible for Kant to circumvent the ontological argument, would 
have to be denied. The argument from morality would_ not then 
be a substantive argument; it would merely indicate how the 
ontological argument was to be completed. 
It is, then, only by postulating a gap between 
speculative and practical reason that Kant can prevent the 
argument from morality from running into the ontological 
argument./ 
-61- 
argument. But in differentiating them in this way, he still 
fails to present the argument from morality as an alternative 
to the ontological argument. The first is different from the 
second, but it is different because what it attempts to prove 
is different. The demand of morality is not the ideal of 
knowledge. And so the argument from morality is not an 
alternative to the ontological argument. 
Morality can demand the existence of God only because 
it is autonomous. But because it is autonomous, the God it 
demands cannot be the ideal of speculation. If morality is 
autonomous, then religion is heteronomous, and then the 
object o;. religion must be less than the ens realissimum which 
speculation requires. The demand of practical reason is a 
demand for an ally, but the ideal of speculative reason is an 
absolute reality which must repudiate the position of an ally. 
If the demand of practical reason is to be a demand 
for the ideal of speculative reason, then morality must cease 
to be autonomous. The moral law must not be regarded as 
externally necessitating God, but as necessitating God because 
it is God. But then, if morality ceases to be autonomous, it 
will be unable to demand anything in its own right. The moral 
law will assert itself because God, in whom it is contained, 
asserts Himself. And thus the argument from morality will 
reduce/ 
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reduce to an ontological argument. 
Either, then, the argument from morality must be 
transformed into an ontological argument, or its object is not 
God, that is, an absolute reality. Pre- supposing a restriction 
in knowledge which makes it impossible to prove directly and 
immediately that God is through Himself, but yet holding that 
God is and that He is 'through Himself, one of two courses is 
open. Either it is assumed that that restriction may be over- 
come, so that we grasp the nature of God even in the appearances 
that filter through to us - and then the argument which is 
regarded as an alternative to the ontological argument becomes 
an ontological argument and can be properly stated and accepted 
only as such. This is the position that Thomas is committed to. 
Or, on the other hand, the restriction on knowledge is rigidly 
adhered to, so that the necessity of God is realised through 
something outside God, and the alternative to the ontological 
argument is a genuine alternative. In this case, God ceases 
to be through Himself. He is derivative and dependent on 
another. And then the ground of the rejection of the ontological 
argument is not the limitation of our knowledge, but the falsity 
of our concept of God. The ontological argument has been 
denied in principle, and not merely because of its attainability 
to us. And thus God as tine absolute reality has been denied. 
This/ 
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This is the position of Kant. 
Thus the rejection of the ontological argument is 
not Compatible with a belief in an absolute reality on any other 
ground. Either the ontological argument must be accepted or a 
grounded belief it an absolute reality must go. 
10. The ontological argument is not, then, a mere tour de 
force or a gratuitous mystification. It is the only argument 
that can establish an absolute reality. And if philosophy is 
the search for an absolute reality, then it is, as Hegel holds, 
an argument which "recurs in every philosophy, even against its 
wish and without its knowledge" (1). An absolute reality can 
only be proved to be through itself, since if it recognises 
anything outside itself which can in its own right lead to it, 
it destroys. itself., 
In arguing to an absolute reality, you may premise 
nothing but its idea. And thus that idea must be presented 
immediately. It must not be necessitated by anything else, 
and if it is suggested by anything else, that must be regarded 
merely as a hole through which it appears. And then the idea 
must of itself dictate its own actuality. Since the idea of 
God is grounded in nothing outside itself, so it must realise 
itself through nothing but itself. Mediate inference must give 
way / 
(1) The Logic of Hegel (trans. Wallace) P. 333. 
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way to immediate explication. The cosmological argument 
breaks down because it proceeds through judgment, aid judgment 
works only within a system. Judgment transmits a force which 
it does not itself possess. Thus it is impossible through 
judgment to substantiate the existence of an absolute reality 
which in itself possesses all force. 
Judgment states identity in and through difference. 
It mediates between appearance and reality. In order that an 
absolute reality may be reached, mediation must be abolished. 
Nothing may be left outside the absolute reality, and thus both 
an immediate apprehension of the idea of God, and an immediate 
actualisation of that idea are necessary. The idea may not be 
reached through judgment, nor may its existence be proved 
through judgment. Since the absolute reality is the self - 
sufficient, the argument that establishes the absolute must be 
self- sufficient. But no judgment is self -sufficient. 
Therefore the absolute reality may be established only through 
a form of knowledge which has transcended judgment. 
The ontological argument is the proof of the absolute 
reality, because in it alone is the attempt made to substantiate 
this knowledge beyond judgment. 
The question of the existence of an absolute reality 
is, then, the question of the existence of a kind of knowledge 
beyond judgment. And the validity of the ontological argument 
depends/ 
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depends upon the validity of its pretension to substantiate 
the existence of such a knowledge by actually attaining it. 
The problem of the ontological argument is thus a logical 
problem. Does it proceed from the immediate apprehension of 
the idea of God to its immediate actualisation, as it pretends? 
Or is the idea obtained, and therefore actualised, -through an 
unacknowledged. mediation - through a suppressed reference to a 
content outside it? Is the ontological argument genuinely 
different from the cosmological argument, so that it escapes 
the difficulties attendant on a proof of an absolute reality 
through judgment, or is it not? 
11. The cosmological argument has to be given up because, 
while in its premises it regards appearances as real enough to 
specify the absolute reality, in its conclusion it has to regard 
these premises as not real at all - as mere appearances and 
nothing else. Thus the ontological argument is proposed as a 
substitute because in it, it is claimed, there is no reference 
to appearances. The absolute reality is proved through itself 
alone, and consequently the contradictions which arise in any 
attempt to determine the status of appearances relative to the 
absolute reality do not arise. 
The ontological argument fails because it cannot make 
good/ 
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good this claim. It is impossible to prove an absolute reality 
except by reference to its aopearances, and consequently the 
ontological argument falls into the same contradictions as the 
cosmological argument. The ontological argument does not proceel 
through the concept of the absolute reality alone. Both that 
concept and the proof of its existence pre -suppose the reality 
of other facts - appearances- and consequently the reality which 
is obtained from it cannot be an absolute reality, since it is 
not an unique reality. 
The proof of any reality is the proof of its ability 
(along with other realities) to account for a given se-6 of 
appearances. IG is that which meets the demands of its appear- 
ances. If, then, you refuse to take account of these appearances, 
you do not merely evade the difficulties of your problem, you 
evade the problem itself. Thus the attempt or the ontological 
argument to prove an absolute reality through itself alone is 
impossible. It must somehow refer to the appearances which it 
pretends to account for. And it would never have seemed to 
have the slightest cogency unless it did. 
The difference between she cosmological and the 
ontological arguments is not that the one refers its absolute 
reality to appearances, while the other does not. The diffwence 
is rather that the referencesin the two cases are different. 
And even so, the difference does not go very deep - it is a 
difference in stress and direction, and not in kind. 
It/ 
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It has been seen (Paragraph 5.) that an effective 
cosmological argument must contain two lines of approach from 
appearances to their absolute reality: - 
i. That which secures the absolute dependence of 
appearances on the absolute reality, and thus 
ends in the identification of appearances with 
absolute reality. 
ii. That which secures difference between appearances 
and the absolute reality by regarding the 
absolute reality as the final term of a series 
of values. 
And it has also been seen (Paragraph 6.) that the cosmological 
.argument fails because it attempts to consummate these two lines 
of approach independently, and yet to identify the conclusions 
which are reached through them. It attempts to obtain the 
identity in difference which holds between a reality and its 
appearances by obtaining identity and difference separately 
and then adding them together. And the result is that, 
instead of supplementing, they destroy each other. 
Now the ontological argument seeks to avoid this 
difficulty by advancing from appearances to their absolute 
reality along only one line of approach (the value series), 
and then,to secure what was previously secured by the other 
approach, it attempts to prove, first that this absolute reality 
does exist among appearances, and secondly that it must necessarily 
exist. 
The cosmological argument consisted of three steps : - 
i./ 
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i. An advance from appearances to that through which 
all appearances are, and which alone is through 
itself. 
ii. An advance fróm appearances to that which is greater 
than any appearances, and than which nothing at all 
is greater. 
iii. The identification of these two. 
And the ontological argument, too, consists in three 
steps:- 
i. An advance from appearances to that than which a 
greater cannot be thought (or the supremely 
perfect). 
ii. The proof that that is. 
Iii. The proof that it cannot be thought not to be. 
12. i. The idea of God which is the premise of the 
ontological argument is presented by Anselm and Descartes as 
isolated and underived. Anselm argues that 'that than which a 
greater cannot be thought' is the meaning of the term 'God', 
and that even the fool who denies God must understand the meaning 
of the term and thus have the idea of 'that than which a greater 
cannot be thought'. Descartes summarily asserts that the idea 
of the supremely perfect is one of the ideas contained in the 
treasury of the mind. 
Now it is no doubt necessary at the beginning of an 
enquiry to take terms to a certain extent on trust. And so 
Anselm and Descartes are in the first instance justified in 
regarding/ 
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regarding 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' and the 
'supremely perfect' as more than mere words. They are justified 
at least in regarding these words as having meaning, and this 
may no doubt be expressed by saying that those who hear these 
words have an idea of 'that than which a greater cannot be 
thought' or of the 'supremely perfect'. 
But although this procedure may be admitted as a 
temporary expedient to initiate a discussion, it may not be 
regarded as finally absolving these ideas without any closer 
scrutiny. When we have baldly affirmed the terms we are going 
to use in any discourse, we have not completed that discourse; 
we have not indeed properly started on it. To have an idea is 
not enough. We must examine that idea. 
Now, any examination of an idea can proceed only by 
relating it to other ideas (1). It is regarded in its place 
among other ideas ana it is justified by the extent to which it 
succeeds in filling that place. But an idea has its place 
among other ideas only because it has been constructed to fill 
that place. It fits in among other ideas because it has been 
prescribed by those ideas. Ideas do not float about before they 
are dragged down to their appropriate station. They occupy 
stations all along: they are what they are only in relation to 
other ideas. There has been a blank in knowledge, but it is not 
a/ 
(I) The term 'idea' as used in this paragraph is 
subject to the specifications the succeeding paragraph. 
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a mere blank; it is a blank defined by the ideas which cannot 
be linked up across it, and an idea has been formulated to fill 
this blank. It has been judged to be necessary. No ideas 
,re constructed gratuitously; they appear to satisfy demands. 
And any idea always makes some reference to the demands which it 
has been formulated to satisfy. It always refers back to its 
station among the other ideas which prescribefit, and you can 
accept it only along with and among those other ideas. 
So it is with the idea of God in the ontological 
arguments of Anselm and. Descartes. They are not what they are 
in themselves, but only in relation to other ideas. The words 
'that than which a greater cannot be thought' (or the 'supremely 
perfect') do not evoke a solitary idea, but a whole system of 
ideas within which 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' 
(or the 'supremely perfect') has its apprOpriate place. These 
ideas are not absolute but relative. Only a system of ideas is 
absolute, and it only when you are thinking through, and not of 
it. When it, in iGs turn, becomes an object of thought, it, 
too, becomes relative in being placed in a wider system. And 
there is no end to this process. An idea can be thought only 
within a system, and if there is nothing outside it to constitute 
its system, then it cannot be thought. At no point can the idea 
and its system be identified. 
The systems within which the ideas of God of Anselm 
and Descartes have their places, and from which therefore tney 
derive/ 
-71- 
derive their meaning, are series whose initial terms are the 
things of this world. 'That than which a greater cannot be 
thought' is the final term of the series, 'great which can be 
thought',' greater which can be thought', 'greatest 
which can be thought'. And the 'supremely perfect' is the 
final term of the series, 'somewhat perfect', 'more perfect' 
'most perfect'. Apart from these series, the ideas 
of God postulated by Anselm and Descartes have no meaning. 
And thus to acknowledge one or other of these ideas is to 
acknowledge one or other of these series. Thus, the idea of 
God which is the premise of the ontological argument is 
obtained only through a reference to what will afterwards be 
regarded as the mere creatures of God, which cannot therefore 
specify their creator. And so the ontological argument fails 
to evade the contradiction of the cosmological argument. 
'That than which a greater cannot be thought' is 
thought only through these things than which a greater can be 
thought. The real question is how these other things are less 
than they might be, And it is only through the answer to this 
question that it is possible to realise the meaning-of 'that 
than which a greater cannot be thought'. Anselm' s. idea of God 
pre -supposes an advance from the relatively great to the 
absolutely great, and without thinking this advance it is 
impossible to think the idea. But in order that we may think 
this/ 
this advance, we must start with the lesser greats, which 
afterwards turn out to be not great at all. We can reach 
the absolute reality only by filching from is some of its 
reality to transfer to its appearances. 
Thus the first step of Anselm's ontological argument 
consists in a suppressed re- statement of such a series as forms 
the first step of his cosmological argument. The series implied 
by the idea of God postulated in the ontological argument is not 
identical with the series asserted in the cosmological argument, 
since in the former it is 'greatness which can be thought' and 
not value simply which is in question. But this difference 
does not enable Anselm to evade in the ontological argument the 
contradiction that has been found in the cosmological argument. 
The series asserted in the Monologium and the Proslogion are 
different, but they are both series. And that is the essential 
point. The idea of the absolute' reality has been obtained in 
both cases by clambering up its appearances. 
The only advantage that the specification of God as 
'that than which a greater cannot be thought' has over His 
specification as 'that which is so superior to other things that 
it is inferior to none' is that the series of which the former 
is the final term may be plausibly asserted to have a final 
term, whereas 'the other may not. In the Monologium, Anselm 
brought his value series to a close only by means of the general 
principle that no series is infinite. But in the Proslogion 
he/ 
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he is enabled to dispense with this in considering not merely 
'greatness' simply, but 'greatness which can be thought'. 
This, of course, would be Quite ineffective if thought 
were identical with knowledge (understanding), and that were 
regarded,(as it is by Anselm), as the faculty of truth. In that 
case the reference to thought would be otiose. 'That than which 
a greater cannot be thought' would be 'that tnan which there is 
no greater', that is, 'the greatest'. Greatness being unqualifisi, 
the series whose standard it is, could be brought to a close, as 
in the case of the cosmological argument, only through the 
assertion of the general impossibility of an infinite series. 
But Anselm, although he sometimes repudiates it,makes a 
distinction between understanding and thought. What can be 
understood to be, is; and what can be understood not to be, is not. 
But that is not the case with thought, since the range of thought 
is no-t co- extensive with the spread of reality. What is, can 
be th -ought not to be, and what is not can be thought to be (1). 
Thus his Qualification of 'greatness' as 'thinkable greatness' is 
a speä.fication of greatness which enables him to assert a 
'greatest'/ 
(1) Multa cogitamus non esse, quae scimus esse; et 
multa esse, quae non esse scimus; non existimando, sed 
fingendo ita esse ut cogitamus. ,(Liber Apologeticus 
contra Gaunilonem, Cap. IV.) 
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'greatest thinkable' where he would not be able to assert a 
'greatest' simply. But it still remains true,as he himself 
recognises (1), that 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' 
is obtained as the final term of the series involving those thinzs 
than which a greater can be thought. 
An objection may, at this point, be lodged on behalf of 
Descartes. Granted, it may be said, that Anselm's idea of God 
pre-supposes the construction of a series involving the creatures 
of God, yet that cannot be said of Descartes. It may be agreed 
that/ 
(1) Anselm is replying to Gaunilo. "Quod dicis: quo majus 
cogitari nequit, secundem rem vel ex genere tibi vel ex 
specie notam, te cogitare auditum, vel in intellectu habere 
non posse; quoniam nec ipsam rem nosti, nec eam ex alia 
simili potes cognoscere; palam est rem aliter lese habere. 
Quoniam namque omne minus bonum in tantum est simile majori 
bono, in quantum est bonum; patet cuilibet rationali menti 
quia de minoribus bonis ad majora conscendendo, ex his, quibus 
aliquid cogitari potest majus, mul.tu.m possumus conjicere illud, 
quo nihil potest majus cogitari. Quis enim,verbi gratia, vel 
hoc cogitari non potest, etiam si non credat in re esse quod 
cogitat, scilicet, si bonum est aliquid, quod initium et finem 
habet; multo melius esse bonum, quod, licet incipiat, non tamer 
desinit: et sicut istud illo melius est, ita isto esse melius 
illud, quod nec finem habet nec initium, etiamsi semper de 
praeterito per praesens transeat ad futurum: ei; sive nit in 
re aliquid hujusmodi, sive non sit; valde tarnen eo melius 
esse id, quod nullo modo indiget vel cogitur mutari, vel 
moveri: an hoc cogitari non potest; aut aliquid hou majus 
cogitari potest aut non est hoc ex jis, quibus majus cogitari 
valet, conjicere id quo majus cogitari nequit? Est igitur 
unde possit conjici, quo majus cogitari nequeat. Sic itaque 
facile refelli potest insipiens, qui sacram auctoritatem non 
recipit; si negat, quo majus cogitari non valet, ex aliis rebus 
conjici posse. At si quis Catholicus hoc neget, meniinerit 
quia intisibilia Dei a creatura mundi Der ea uae f.cta unt 
divihitas (Rom. I, 20). (Ibid, Cap. VIII). 
c 
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that the idea of God,which is the premise of the ontological 
argument cannot be completely in the air. It must have some 
connection with the rest of our experience. But that is not 
sufficient to show that it is reached at the end of a series 
rooted in appearances. The disjunction: 'Either the idea of 
the absolute reality has no connection with experience, or it is 
derived from appearances', is false, since there is more in 
experience than the appearances which are its objects. Besides 
these, there is that which makes it possible for those appear- 
ances to be objects to us at all. And that is the ideal 
standard through which these appearances are judged to be what 
they are. Now, in the case of Descartes, at least, this is 
the derivation of the idea of God. The supremely perfect is 
connected with experience as the underived and underivable 
standard of all experience. The imperfect things of this 
world. appear to form a series which culminates in it, only because 
it is involved in the very apprehension of these imperfect things. 
It appears to be derived from them because they, in reality, are 
derived from it. And even though no indications of such a 
derivation of 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' 
are given by Anselm, yet nevertheless it is still possible to 
make a similar claim for that, and to maintain that the account 
he gives of its derivation does not represent his real position, 
allowed 
but only the position he Ix& himself to be forced into in the 
stress of controversy. It may, at least, be said that the 
validity/ 
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validity of his argument does not depend on that position, and 
it is therefore open to anyone to suggest an alternative 
derivation for his idea of God to safeguard his argument. Thus 
it may be suggested, in spite of Anselm, that 'that than which 
a greater cannot be thought' is prior to the series which 
culminates in it, and therefore it cannot be held, as it is held 
here, that the idea is derived from the series. 
The strength of this contention for an ideal standard 
of the supremely perfect, as an ultimate principle of mind, is 
that it provides a plausible account of that feature of mind 
which always needs to be insisted on, because it is always in 
danger of being forgotten. In the desire to obtain over- 
hastily an exact science of mind, it is continually apt to be 
thought of as of the same kind as the sciences of matter. That 
tends to make us forget the activity of the mind, and that 
omission in the case of cognition, which concerns us here, makes 
it impossible to give any account of the development of knowledge. 
On any mechanical theory of mind, increase of knowledge means 
only increase of the things which are known. But no -one who 
has not blinded himself to the facts in the interests of a false 
criterion of exactitude, can believe that increase of knowledge 
consists merely in the increase of the things which are known. 
That is certainly an element in it, but it is a derivative 
element. It ignores that very factor in mind of which it is 
pretending/ 
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pretending to give an account - the factor of inference, by 
which we advance from less to greater knowledge. It considers 
the knowledge which is earlier and that which is later in 
isolation, and completely ignores the relation between them. 
Now, the doctrine that an ideal of knowledge is an 
indispensable prius of knowledge, which is stated in some form 
or other by all the philosophers who stand in the main line of 
the history of philosophy, does attempt to account for this 
relation. It insists that there are two factors in the 
development of knowledge: (i) comprehension of the unsatisfact- 
oriness of a prior stage of knowledge, and (ii) comprehension 
of a, subsequent stage which will better that prior stage. But 
it insists, at the same time, that neither of these factors 
exists in separation from the other. They are elements of a 
principle which involves them both - the ideal of knowledge 
through which all knowledge is thought and to which it al ways 
seeks to approximate. 
Now, some principle of this kind must undoubtedly be 
postulated in mind. The problem of mind is more than the 
problem of its content at any particular time. It is the 
problem of the devlopment of its content in the past, as that 
seeks to develop in the future. But it cannot be postulated in 
this defence of 
the form required by/the ontological argument, since that, far 
from saving the development of knowledge, would destroy it, The 
principle/ 
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principle of trie development of mind must be a pure principle, 
that is, an empty principle. It must be a principle which is 
always active in thought but is never materialised into a content 
of thought. If it is materialised into a content, then it will 
become a phantom luring on to an infinite regress. In order 
that it may be thought as a content, it will require to be 
thought through another principle; and then when that principle 
in its turn becomes a content, it will demand a further principle; 
and so on indefinitely. 
This will be the result of the materialisation in the 
principle of mind, in so far as it affects that principle itself. , 
But the result will be more serious still on the knowledge which 
it is pretending to give an account of. As soon as you regard 
this principle as a standard with a definite content of its own, 
you are faced with the problem of its applicability to the facts 
to which it is applied. You have converted it from a principle 
into a fact, a given, which determines knowledge not de jure but 
de facto. But knowledge cannot acknowledge any de facto 
suzerainty. It cannot acknowledge determination by anything but 
the facts which are its objects, and it cannot therefore 
acknowledge any action upon these facts by an ultimate standard 
which it is impossible either to deny or to verify. It is 
impossible to deny that truth is attainable, because that is a 
claim made by everybody, even by those who, per impossibile, 
would attempt to deny it. But the materialisation of the 
principle! 
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principle of mind into a standard results in precisely this 
impossible denial. If such a standard is always active in us, 
we want a guarantee that it is not distorting the facts that we 
know through it. But this guarantee can be produced only if 
the standard ceases to be a standard and becomes a fact which 
can be related to the facts which, it is said, are known through 
it. But the possibility of this which is undeniably demanded 
by knowledge, implies that the standard is not ultimate. We 
can think without it, since otherwise we could not think it 
alongside other facts in order that we might judge its relation 
to these facts, and so justify it as a standard of these facts. 
We do undoubtedly use standards in knowledge - we use, 
for example, a yard-stick. But we use them all as we use 
yard -sticks, as means to a particular purpose in a particular 
context, which are to be judged by their efficacy in promoting 
the fulfilment of that purpose in that context. There is no 
standard of knowledge in general, because that would be a., 
standard which we could not judge and which, therefore, we 
would not acquiesce in. 
The relation between an earlier and a later stage of 
knowledge is not a third fact besides these other two facts. 
And it could have been supposed to be. so only on the 
supposition that the other two were merely external to each 
not 
other. As soon as it is realised that this is /so - that the 
later stage is demanded by the earlier stage itself - then it 
is seen, 
seen that there is no necessity for a standard to intervene 
between them. 
The error which led to the materialisation of the 
principle of development in mind into a determinate standard 
arises from abstraction. Descartes doubts; he knows that he 
doubts; he knows that he is imperfect; he has the notion of the 
supremely perfect (1). All that this means is that his present 
knowledge is incoherent and is straining towards coherence. And 
to account for this he needs no more than his present knowledge 
as it is developed_ out of his past knowledge. There is never 
any such simple opposition as that postulated here between doubt 
on the one hand, and knowledge on the other. And consequently 
there is no need for them to be united by a standard of perfection. 
The/ 
(1) Discours de la Methode, IV. 
Meditationes de Prima Philosophiae, III. 
It may be noted that this derivation of the idea or 
God is never presented by Descartes in connection with his 
ontological argument (that is, the proof of the existence of 
God from the mere consideration of His nature), but only in 
connection with one of his cosmological arguments (the proof 
of the existence of God from the fact that the idea of God 
exists in us). Thus, in the Fifth Meditation, which contains 
the ontological argument, no reference is made to the 
derivation of the idea of God contained in the Third 
Meditation. The idea of God is presented there (as was 
stated at the beginning of this paragraph) merely as an idea 
that he finds in himself (Certe ejus ideam, nempe entïs summe 
perfecti, no,n minus apud me invenio, quam cujusvis figurae aut 
numeri). And it is similarly presented in the Principia. 
(When the mind afterwards reviews the different ideas that are 
in it, it discovers what is by far the chief among them - that 
of a Being omniscient, all-powerful, and absolutely perfect. 
Principles of Philosophy, XIV. trans. Veitch). 
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The present condition of his knowledge is imperfect and is known 
to be imperfect because it is unstable. Elements in it are in 
conflict, and it is itself specifying the means to be taken to 
resolve these conflicts. His doubt -- that part of his knowledge 
which is unsatisfactory - is not isolated from the rest of his 
knowledge. If it were, it could not be got rid of. It is a 
part of a larger whole of knowledge which has both brought it 
about and will resolve it. It is this larger whole within 
which any knowledge is always contained that performs the 
functions ascribed to the standard of perfection. Any part of 
knowledge is always making demands on every other part. It is 
these demands which search out the weak placed in knowledge, and 
it is these demands that enable these weak places to be patched 
up. The development of knowledge is determined by the lines 
of implication which bind together the facts which are the 
content of knowledge, that is, by the facts in their connection. 
Beyond these facts in their connection, there is nothing but the 
mind trying to prove itself equal to them, that is, endeavouring 
by hypothesis and experiment to get at the facts. This, at any 
rate5is the claim of anyone who endeavours to know and believes 
that the attainment of his endeavour is not impossible. And 
this is open to contradiction by nobody. 
Thus this defence of the absoluteness of the idea cE 
God, which is the premise or the ontological argument, fails. 
It/ 
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It fails because it has not distinguished between the principle 
of development in mind, which is absolute, and the standards 
employed by it, which are not absolute. And wfien this 
distinction is asserted and the objection refuted, the original 
contention remains the idea or God, which is the premise of 
the ontological argument, is arrived at through something other 
than itself, and therefore the ontological argument is involved 
in the contradiction of the cosmological argument. 
13. ii. The first count against the ontological argument 
is that its claim to an underived ideal of God is false: The 
second is that even alt.nough that claim is false, it nevertheless 
wrecks any attempt to prove the existence of God. The proof of 
the existence of anything of which we have an idea consists in 
the tightening up of its connections with the ideas of the facts 
from which it is derived and by which it has been specified. 
If, then, it is asserted that it is underived, it is impossible 
to prove that it exists. Any connection which can be proved 
to obtain between an ideaand facts must be developed from, and 
determined by, the connection which has been taken up into 
th -e initial specification of the idea. 
Strictly speaking, there can be no such thing as a 
proof of the existence of an idea, because there can be no 
disjunction between the idea and existence. No idea can at 
any/ 
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any stage be a mere idea unconnected with existence. The 
ideas which (as has been pointed out in the previous paragraph) 
specify an idea are ideas of existents, and so the idea that 
they specify is all along considered as an idea of an existent. 
You never start off with a given idea to determine 
whether or not it exists. You start off with the ideas of a 
number of existents which are recognised as connected, but whose 
connections are not completely provided for. If the connections 
which are recognised to hold between them are to be provided for, 
another existent is required to mediate between them. This 
must exist; otherwise it cannot be regarded as interacting with 
the other existents to provide a comprehensible and comprehensive 
system. There is no question as to its existence; the only 
question is as to what exactly it is that exists. At the 
beginning all that can be said is that it is such that it will 
provide for the lines of implication between the other existents 
which are demanded by them, but which they cannot of themselves 
provide. Thus the very statement of the problem is the first 
step to its solution. And the subsequent steps of its solution 
consist in the refinement of the problem with the aid of 
hypothesis and its correlative, experiment. A vague idea of 
the demands of the existents which are to be related in a system 
suggests the general character of the existent which they demand. 
This is specified as far as possible with our present incomplete 
knowledge/ 
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knowledge of the existents (incomplete because they have not 
yet been systematised). And then the effects of the interaction 
of the suggested existent, along with the other existents, is 
deduced. If these effects are such as do actually take place, 
and if, further, no effects which do take place remain unaccounted 
for, then the suggested nature of the existent is verified. If 
not, then in the light of the discrepancies between trie actual and 
the inferred effects of the interaction of tree existents, the 
conjecture as to the nature of the further existent is modified. 
This hypothesis is tested in its turn, and it again is either 
accepted or modified. And so on. 
It may and does happen that in the process of specifying 
the demands of the existents we postulate, we find that we have 
been mistaken as to what some of them were. The effects which 
would follow on their interaction with the conjectured existent 
are not those which actually follow, because we are in error as 
to the nature of the existents which we regard as substantiated, 
and not as to that which we regard as still to be substantiated. 
And this may go so far as to show that one of the premised 
existents does not exist at all (1). Again, it may happen as 
a result of fuller knowledge that the existents which seem to 
require another existent to round them off into a system, are 
found not to do so. They are themselves able to account for all 
the/ 
(1) Thir seems, for example, to have happened to the 
'ether' as the result of the Mitchelson- Morley 
experiment. 
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the effects which follow on their interaction. But when 
existence is disproved in this way, nothing is left behind in 
the way of idea. It is an existent - idea plus existence - 
which is abandonned because it is unnecessary. And in the same 
way it is an existent - idea plus existence - which can alone be 
proved. There are no such things as 'floating ideas' - ideas 
divorced from existence. There are only existents - nroved or 
disproved, conjectured or doubted. 
In all this procedure there is no question of existence 
which is to be added to an idea. The whole argument is concerned 
with the precise nature of an existent, and the nature or that 
existent is determined by the demands of the existents among 
which it is to be placed. In the ontological argument, on the 
other hand, the existents among which the absolute reality is to 
be placed are disregarded. And in view of the purpose of the 
ontological argument, they are rightly disregarded, because 
absolutely, that is, in relation to the absolute reality, they 
are not. Thus in the ontological argument we have in our heads 
an idea of an absolute reality completely free from any 
entanglements with existents. And we are going to prove that 
that idea exists - not here or there, not now or at any other 
time, not in connection with this or that set of existents - 
but simply. 
The ontological argument must adopt this attitude if 
it is to be a real alternative to the cosmological argument. 
But/ 
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But When it has adopted it, it is faced with a complete impasse. 
Existence under these circumstances, when all connection of the 
idea with existents is not merely ignored but denied, cannot 
mean anything at all. Thus even if it is granted that the 
ontological argument is valid and proves that God exists, it 
will have gained nothing because no relation has been established 
between God and anything else. But it is precisely relations 
between God and other things (notably ourselves) that we are 
really asking for in a proof of the existence of God. Thus 
the ontological argument, refusing, as iu must, to admit the 
determinate demands of appearances, and admitting instead only 
the demand of its idea of God for abstract existence, has 
simplified its problem to such an extent that any solution 
which, leer imDossibile, could be obtained would be worthless. 
The ontological argument rests on an untenable 
distinction between what a thing is, and that it is. It starts 
with a given 'what', whole and complete, and professes to prove 
the existence of just that 'what', without allowing for, and 
even expressly excluding, any alteration in it. What is proved 
to be at the end is precisely what is not known to be at the 
beginning. The existence which it is sought to add to this 
nature, then, is wholly external to it, and being wholly external 
to it, it is wholly extraneous and therefore wholly immaterial 
to it. Granting the distinction between the nature and the 
existence of God, the existence reduces to nothing. Thus, 
on/ 
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on Anseim's premises, a proof of, the existence of God is simply 
nou worth worrying about, since it is what God is and not that 
He is that alone is of any importance. This is the reduction 
of the positions of Anseim and Descartes when their separation 
of what a thing is from that it is, is made explicit. But this 
is not the end of the matter, as Hegel seems to think. It is 
not profitable to continue on this pre-sun-position to pour scorn 
on the category of being as "the utterly abstract's and thus to 
assert that "the question regarding the being of Clod ... is of 
slight importance". (1) It is necessary to go further and to 
deny that what anything is can be thought without at the same time 
thinking that it is. Nature and existence are established 
concurrently. It is impossible to dictate from above what is 
to be established to exist, since what a thing is, is how it is; 
and' how it is, is that it is. 
In the preceding paragraph it was pointed out that the 
ontological argument is really a cosmological argument, since the 
idea of 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' can be 
thought only in relation to those things than which a greater 
can be thought. In this paragraph what is really the same 
point is made in saying that the ontological argument, in trying 
to establish the existence of 'that than which a greater cannot 
be/ 
(1) Logic of Hegel, trans. Wallace, p. 168. 
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be thought, viciously differentiates what God is from that He is. 
The derivation from other things which is necessary and yet, it 
is asserted, is lacking to the idea of God, according to the 
first criticism, is the existence that is necessary and yet 
which cannot be proved of God, according to this second criticism 
It is because the idea of God is derivative and yet pretends not 
to be, that it is impossible to give a meaning to the existence 
of God which the ontological argument attempts to prove. 
On these grounds it must be asserted that not only 
is the ontological argument vicious, but the criticism it has 
frequently met with is more vicious. The crucial point in 
the ontological argument for both Anselm and Descartes and their 
opponents is the passage from the idea of God to the existence of 
God. Anselm and Descartes reckon that they can effect this 
passage. Their opponents say that they cannot. But the 
crucial point in the argument is not the jump from idea to 
existence; it is rather the initial separation of idea and 
existence. There is, and can be, no idea which is not an idea 
dictated by existents. And idea, to be an idea, must be an 
idea of something, and there is nothing else but existents for 
it to be an idea of. That is the count against the arguments 
of Anselm and Descartes, but it is equally, and more, the 
count against their critics. The latter rest in the vicious 
disjunction of understanding from reality, where the former 
attempt to bridge it. It is impossible to bridge the gap 
between/ 
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between understanding ana reality, as they attempt to do. But 
then there is no need to bridge it. It is bridged already, 
since understanding is only of reality. Anselm and Descartes 
have committed two blunders and their critics only one, but 
whereas Anselm and Descartes by their second blunder undo their 
first, their critics obstinately persist in the first.. 
Starting with thought as exclusive of things, it is impossible 
to get to things. But then thoughts are not exclusive of 
things; they are of things. 
The force of an argument is constituted by the 
necessity or cogency that runs through it. The argument itself 
is its necessity. Now this necessity may be said to be a 
necessity either of thought or of things. There is, and can 
be, no necessity attaching to thought apart from things. When 
therefore, as in the ontological argument, the exclusion of 
thought from things is initially postulated, necessity is ruled 
out, and consequently argument. It is the absence of cogency 
that destroys the ontological argument, and the absence of 
cogency results in the mutual exclusion of thought and reality. 
When thought is excluded from reality, it must be placed along- 
side reality as another conglomeration of fact. And then you 
cannot say that God must be thought, nor even that God is thought. 
You can say only that God is a fact in thought, and from this 
there is no possibility of arguing to the conclusion that He is 
also a fact in reality, since by the dissociation of thought 
from reality the co gency which constitutes arguments has 
disappeared./ 
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disappeared. What should have been stated for the ontological 
argument to be sound, is not merely that God is a fact in 
thought, but that He cannot but be thought. But this is 
precisely what cannot be stated by the argument, since that 
demands an idea of God which is not initially excluded from, 
but positively demanded by existents. And then the ontological 
argument would become a cosmological argument in tightening up 
the connection between the idea and the things that have 
specified it. 
Note: Bradley (Appearance and Reality, p. 395 ff.) has 
turned this argument for the rejection of the ontological proof 
into an argument for its acceptance. He to whom we owe the 
very term 'floating idea' has upheld the most flagrant instance 
of the heresy which he has most explicitly denounced. 
(Essays in Truth and Reality: On Floating Ideas). "A thought 
only in my head, or a bare idea separated from all relation to 
the world ", he says, "is a false abstraction. To hold 
a thought is, more or less vaguely, to refer it to Reality. And 
hence an.dea wholly unreferred would be a self -contradiction. 
This general result at once bears on the ontological proof. 
Evidently the proof must start with an idea referred to, and 
qualifying Reality, and with Reality present also and determined 
by the content of the idea. And the principle of the argument 
is simply this, that standing on one side of such a whole, you 
find/ 
find yourself moved necessarily towards the other side. Mere 
thought because incomplete, suggests logically the other element 
already implied in it; anal that element is the Realil,y which 
appears in existence. Not every idea will, as such, be 
real, or as such, have existence. But the greater the 
perfection of a thought, and the more its possibility and its 
internal necessity are increased, so much more reality it 
possesses. And so much the more necessarily must it show 
itself, and appear somewhere in existence The idea at 
the Absolute, as an idea, is inconsistent with itself; and we 
find that, to complete itself, it is internally driven to take 
in existence." 
It is agreed that no ideas are 'floating'. And the 
question then is: What is to be done about this idea of the 
Absolute, which is represented as 'floating'? Bradley says that 
it must be anchored to Reality, so that it may cease to float. 
He takes it for granted that it is a thoroughly reputable idea, 
and regards it as suffering from a temporary misfortune. And 
idea 
so, since no reputable ideas float, this reputable /must be 
anchored. But this begs the whole question. . If the idea is 
caught floating, the obvious inference surely is that it is not 
reputable. At any rate the onus is on the idea to show that it 
is reputable. It must show itself capable of linking up with 
Reality/ 
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Reality, and it must provide some explanation of how it came to 
be separated from Reality. And if it refuses to do this, then 
it has no claim on us - it must be left floating. But this is 
precisely what must happen to the idea of the Absolute. It 
cannot acknowledge a genesis from Reality, and it cannot therefore 
signify any point at which it could enter Reality. 
for it, 
we wished to do anything we could not. 
Thus even if 
The principle: "To hold a thought is ... to refer it 
us 
to Reality ", does not justify /in first constructing an unreferred 
thought, and then afterwards referring it to Reality. It 
expressly forbids it. Every thought from the very beginning 
must be referred to Reali-.y, precisely because, "an idea wholly 
unreferred is a contradiction ". The ontological argument does 
not start "with an idea referred to and qualifying Reality ". 
If it did, then there would be no reason for it to proceed, 
It is because the idea is unreferred at the beginning that it is 
necessary to proceed with the proof that it must be referred. 
Nor, on the other hand, does the argument start "with Reality 
present also and determined by the content of uhe idea ", since 
if it did, the whole object of the argument would have been 
attained. Bradley cannot have it both ways: either there is 
a movement from idea to existence, or there is not. If there 
is not, the argument is unnecessary. If there is, it is, on 
his own premises, impossible. 
Thought/ 
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Thought and Reality, again, are not sides of any whole, 
such that "standing on one side of [it] , you find_ yourself 
moved necessarily towards the other ". If you pre -suppose a 
separation between Thought and Reality, this principle will 
doubtless be useful in connecting them. But is is unnecessary 
to pre - suppose any such. separation. And this is what the denial 
of 'floating ideas' means. Thought is always of Reality, and 
Reality is always as thought. You cannot stand on either of 
these for any fraction of time without involving the other. 
In standing on either you are already, and in virtue of that very 
fact, standing on the other. "Mere thought, because incomplete; 
cannot suggest logically "... the Reality which appears in 
existence ". Logical suggestion, that is, implication, holds in 
thought only so far as thought is of reality. The true 
implications of thought are the real connections of things. 
If, then, you initially dissociate thought from reality, you 
have deprived yourself of all implication, and therefore of that 
by which alone you can associate thought with reality. Thus 
thought's 
apart from connection with reality it is impossible to assert 
degrees of perfection, or possibility, or internal necessity, 
among thoughts. And it is impossible, therefore, to argue that 
as thoughts possess these in greater or less degree, so will they 
possess in greater or less degree the reality which appears in 
existence. It is only as thoughts are of existents in relation 
to/ 
-94- 
to other existents, that they possess perfection, or possibility, 
or necessity. These are all relations which hold among existent 
and therefore are thought of, only so far as the existents among 
which they hold, are thought. They cannot attach to thoughts, 
when by hypothesis, they are not of reality, and so they cannot 
determine the degree to which thoughts exist. 
And so, finally, "the idea of the Absolute, as an idea" 
cannot be "inconsistent with itself ", so that "to complete itself, 
it is internally driven to take in existence ". The idea we have 
of an existent, is inconsistent with itself when it cannot satisfy 
thé legitimate demands of the existents among which it has a place, 
But this cannot be the case with the idea of the Absolute which, 
at the beginning of the ontological argument, is a mere idea. 
It is not the idea of an existent, and therefore it is not called 
upon to satisfy the demands of any other existents. And so, 
because it pretends to do nothing, it cannot prove itself 
insufficient to its pretensions, and thus will not be driven to 
take in existence in order to attain consistency. Being initially 
a 'floating idea', it must for ever remain a 'floating idea'. 
14. These considerations are verified by Gaunilo's 
examination of Anselm's argument, and Anselm's reply to it. 
Anselm argues: God is 'that than which a greater 
cannou be thought' and even the fool who says in his heart that 
there/ 
there is no God, understands this when he hears it. And what 
he understands is in his understanding, even if he does not 
understand it to be. For something can be in the understanding, 
without it being understood to be. For example, when a painter 
knows before-hand what he is going to paint, he certainly has 
his picture in understanding, although he does not yet understand 
it to be, because he has not yet painted it. When, however, 
he has painted it, he both has it in understanding and understands 
it to be. Thus 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' 
must be in the understanding even of the fool, because when 
he hears this, he understands it, and whatever he understands 
is in the understanding. 
But 'that tnan which a greater cannot be thought' 
cannot be in understanding alone. For if it is in understanding 
alone, it can be thought to be also in reality, because what is 
in understanding and in reality is greater than what is in 
understanding alone. If, then, 'teat tnan which a greater 
cannot be thought' is in understanding alone, it is not that 
tnan which a greater cannot be thought. But this is impossible. 
Therefore 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' exists 
both in understanding and in reality (1). 
(1) "Ergo, Domine, qui 
quantum sois expediere, 
et hoc es, quod credimus. . 
aliquid, quo nihil majus 
aliqua talis natura, qui 
est Deus`' f:Psal. XIII , 
cum/ 
das (idei intellectum, da mihi ut, 
intelligam quia et sicut credimus; 
Et quidem credimus te esse 
co itari possit. An ergo non est 
a dixit inslpiens in cord suo: hon 
1 ) Sed certe idem ipse insipiens, 
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Gaunilo objects: If 'that than which a greater cannot 
be thought' is in the fool's understanding only because he 
understands what is said to him, then apparently it is in his 
understanding in the same way as objects which he knows to be 
false or which he does not know to be true. But since the aim 
of the argument is to prove to the fool that he cannot but know 
that 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' is not false, 
then it must be established that it is in his understanding in 
some other way than false or doubtful things. And then to 
understand anything would be to think that that thing is, as 
distinct from merely thinking it. Thus, if the fool is to 
understand, and not merely to think 'that than which a greater 
cannot be.th- ought', he must not merely think it, but further 
think/ 
cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico, aliquid quo majus nihil 
cogitari potest; intelligit quod audit, et quod intelligit 
in intellectu ejus est; etiamsi non intelligat illud esse. 
Aliud est enim rem esse in intellectu; aliud intelligere 
rem esse. Nam cum pictor praecogitat quae facturas est, 
habet quidem in intellectu; sed nondum esse l . git quod 
non-um fecit. Cum vero jam pinxit, et habet ln.intelligït 
esse quod jam fecit. Convincitur ergo etiam insipiens esse 
vel in intellectu aliquid, quo nihil majus cogitari potest; 
quia hoc cum audit, intelligit; et quidquid intelligitur in 
intellectu est. Et certe id, quo majus cogitari nequit, non 
potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo 
intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re: quod majus 
est. Si ergo id, quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo 
intellectu, idipsum, quo majus cogitari non potest, est quo 
majus cogitari potest: sed certe hoc esse non -potest. 
Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari no- 
valet, et in intellectu, et in re. (Proslogion, Cap. II). 
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think that it is. But if this is so,.it will not be one thing 
to have 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' in the 
understanding and another thing to understand that it is, as in 
the case of the picture which is first in the soul of the painter 
and only afterwards in reality. (1). 
The difference between the two cases is that of 
artistic creation and knowledge. What the artist is going to 
create certainly has an existence in his understanding before he 
has created it, since his creation is in some sense independent 
of its material embodiment (2). But this is not so when it is 
a question of knowledge. In that case, where to understand an 
object means to know that it is in reality, it cannot be said to 
be in the knower's understanding as the picture is in the painter's 
understanding, since in the case of knowledge what is understood 
is one thing, and the understanding of it is another (except in 
the case of introspection, where what is understood is itself 
the understanding). Thus, even granting it is true that there 
is something than whicri a greater cannot be thought -- and the 
whole object of the argument is to prove this -- even then it 
cannot be in the understanding as a picture not yet painted is in 
the! 
(1') Gaunilo: Liber pro Insipiente, Cap. II. 
(2) As Augustine has it: Cum faber arcam facturus in 
opere, prius habet illam in arte: arca, quae fit in opere, 
non est vita; arca, quae est in arte, vita est; auia vivit 
anima artificis, in qua sunt irta omnia, antequam Itroferantur. 
(Quoted by Gaunilo, Liber pro Insipiente, Cao. III). 
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the painter's understanding (1). 
Thus, even if it is argued. that that than which a 
greater cannot be thought' is in the fool's understanding as 
false or doubtful things are, the argument is not valid. Pre- 
supposing that 'that than which a greater cannot be tnought' is 
in reality as the only means of ensuring that it is understood, 
yet even so it will not be in the understanding, so that it may 
then be re- asserted that it is in reality. Anselm's argument 
cannot even be circular, 
If the argument, then, is to retain. any cogency, tree 
only existence that can belong to 'that than which a greater 
cannot be thought' in the fool's understand7tg is the existence 
which it has in common with false or doubtful things. But then 
the existence of 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' 
in the understanding, as it cannot be differentiated from the 
existence of false or doubtful things, cannot be used to prove 
any true existence outside the understanding. "If ", says 
Gaunilo, "it can be said that that object which cannot be thought 
according to the truth of any reality is in the understanding, 
then I do not deny that in this way it is in the understanding. 
But because in this way it cannot obtain any real being, I do not 
concede that being to it until it is Droved to me by an 
indubitable argument. But he who says that this is so, because 
otherwise/ 
(1) Liber pro Insipiente, Cap. III. 
otherwise what is greater than all things will not be greater than 
' all things, does not sufficiently consider the understanding of 
the fool when he hears these words. For I do not yet affirm, 
but rather deny or doubt, that it is greater than any true reality. 
Nor do I concede to it any other being than that (if it is fit to 
be called being) which is given to it when the soul tries to 
portray to itself an utterly unknown reality according to the 
words which are heard. How, then, is it proved to me that that 
"greater" subsists in the truth of reality because it is greater 
than all things, when I continue to deny or doubt that ?" (1). 
In order that the existence in reality of 'that than 
which a greater cannot be thought' may be demonstrated through its 
existence in understanding, its existence in understanding may 
not be differentiated from the existence of false or doubtful 
things. But as it is impossible to argue from the existence of 
false or doubtful things in understanding to their existence in 
reality, so it is impossible to argue from the existence in 
understanding of 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' to 
its existence in reality, since the existence in understanding of 
'that than which a greater cannot be thought' cannot be 
differentiated/ 
(1) Gaunilo: Liber pro Insipiente, Cap. V. It will be 
noted that Gaunilo here misrepresents Anselm's position to 
the extent of speaking as if the question at issue concerned 
'that which is greater than all things' instead of 'that tan 
which a greater cannot be thought'. But this (which seems to 
be no more than a careless slip), does not affect the force 
of his argument, as Anselm seems to think. 
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differentiated from the existence in understanding of false or 
doubtful things. 
Anselm replies to this argument by denying the 
distinction on which it is based. It is not, he argues, a 
question of 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' being 
in the fool's understanding either as a reality or as an 
unreality, since it can be in understanding to some extent 
without being either completely understood or not understood at 
all. And it is to some extent, at any rate, understood even 
by the fool because statements about it are understood (1); 
because it is spoken in a familiar language (2); because it is 
denied (3). And this understanding of 'that than which a 
greater cannot be thought' involves no reference to its 
existence in reality. "At the beginning ", he says, "it was 
enough for me to say that that was understood and in the under- 
standing in some way, since it was afterwards considered whether 
it was only in the understanding (as a false object would be), 
or whether it was also in reality as a true object would be." (4) 
And thus he disposes of Gaunilo's attempt to discredit 
the analogy between art and knowledge. "Your careful proofs 
that that than which a greater cannot be thought is not 
comparable to the existence of a picture not yet painted in the 
understanding/ 
(1) Anselm: Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilonem, Cap. I. 
(2) Ibid,. Cap. II. 
(3. Ibid, Cap. IX. 
(4) Ibid, Cap. VI. 
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understanding of the painter are without bearing on the argument. 
For I have not cited the picture so that I might say that it is 
like 'that than which a greater cannot be thought', but only so 
that I might say that something which is not understood to be 
is in the understanding." (1) 
Anselm then defends his argument against Gaunilo's 
attempt by arguing that initially it is immaterial to him whether 
or not 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' is believed 
to exist in reality, since initially he is not concerned with 
its affirmation or denial in understanding, but simply with its 
being an object of understanding. And as that which is under- 
stood is regarded as simply an object of understanding, so the 
existence in understanding which is inferred from that is not 
a judgment, but a simple idea. The existence os 'that than 
which a greater cannot be thought' in understanding neither is, 
nor is not, the existence of false or doubtful things in under- 
standing. It is an existent which has not been qualified either 
as true or false or doubtful. It simply is. 
Gaunilo, apparently, did not return to his attack upon 
Anselm. But the clarification of his position to which Gaunilo 
forced Anselm makes it very easy to push home his attack. By 
asserting that the existence of 'that than which a greater cannot 
be t haughty in the fool's understanding is a mere unqualified 
idea/ 
(1) Ibid, Cap. VIII. 
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idea, Anselm has safeguarded the opening of his argument only 
at the cost of frustrating its development. It is not an idea 
of anything, and hence it is impossible for it to be shown to be, 
at the end, anything other than what it is at the beginning. And 
thus it cannot move beyond understanding into understanding and 
reality, as Anselm asserts. 
In order to demonstrate the existence of 'that than 
which a greater cannot be thought' in reality beyond understanding, 
Anselm asserts that existence in understanding alone is 
insufficient to satisfy its pretension to be the understandirg 
of 'that than which a greater cannot be thought'. But 'that 
than which a greater cannot be tnoughtT,as a simple unqualified 
existent in the understanding, has no pretensions, because it is 
not the understanding of anything. Hence you cannot say that 
it ought to be anything other than it is. You can say this 
only of ideas which are of something beyond themselves which 
they are continually trying to be equal to. But 'that than which 
a greater cannot be thought' in the understanding of the fool 
refers to nothing outside itself. It is part of no judgment. 
It simply is. 
What is in our understanding is subject to specification 
because it is the understanding of an existent among other 
existents. Hence it may be specified either directly by the 
existent which is its immediate object, or indirectly by the 
existents among which that existent has a place, so far as thw 
are/ 
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are understood. No`., that than which a greater cannot be 
thought' cannot be directly specified by the existent which is 
its object, since that is not known directly as an existent. 
It must therefore be specified_ by the existents among which it . 
is placed. 'That than which a greater cannot be thought' will, 
th -en, be the idea of a gap in knowledge ( "an aching void ") which 
is determined by our understanding of those things than which a 
greater can be thought. It is demanded by them, and hence it 
must be what they demand it to be. It owes it to them to be in 
a position to do whatever it pretends to do in its place among 
th em. This is the only basis for the development of 'that than 
which a greater cannot be thought' beyond understanding into 
reality. But this development cannot be asserted in the 
ontological argument, since that is an argument which allows no 
derivation for its idea of God. 
The incompatibility of the first and second parts of 
the ontological argument, is made more evident by Anselm's 
further development of his position. In order that he may 
explain how the fool says in his heart that there is no God, 
Anselm distinguishes two senses in which anything can be thought. 
In one way (secundum voces) only the words signifying it are 
thought; in the other (secundem rem) the thing itself is under- 
stood. And he then maintains that, while in the former way God. 
can be thought not to be, yet in the latter He cannon,, just as 
fire and water cannot be confused if the things therselves are 
thought/ 
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thought, although they can be confused if only the words 
signifying them are tnought(1). 
But the denial of the fool, which forms the starting 
point of the ontological argument, is, on Anselm's own snowing, 
a denial secundum voces. Thus, on Anselm's own premises, it is 
impossible for the argument to have any cogency, since cogency is 
found only in thought secundum rem. 
The real problem of the ontological argument is to 
demonstrate how from thought secundum voces of 'that than which 
a greater cannot be thought', the fool must advance to thought 
secundum rem. But An_selm suggests no way in which this can be 
effected, and while he insists that his argument proves the 
existence/ 
(1) Veram quomodo dixit insipiens in corde suo quod cogi-care 
non :potuit; aut quomodo cogitare non potuit, quod dixit in 
corde? cum idem sit dicere in corde, et cogitare. Quod si 
vere, imo quia vere et cogitavit, quia dixit in corde; et non 
dixit in corde, quia cogitare non potuit; non uno tantum modo 
dicitur aliquid incorde vel cogitatur. Aliter enim cogitatur 
res, cum vox eam significans cogitatur; aliter cum idipsum, cuctd 
res est, inielligitur. Illo itaque modo potest cogitari Deus 
non esse;isto vero, minime. Nullus quippe intelligens id quod 
sunt ignis et aqua, potest cogitare ignem esse aquam secundum 
rem; licet hoc possit, secundum voces. Ita igitur nemo 
inte.11igens la_ quod Deus est, potest cogitare quia Deus non 
est; licet haec verba dicai in corde, aut sine ulla, aut cum 
aliquia extranea significatione. Deus enim est id quo majus 
cogitari_ non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utique 
intelligit- idipsum sic esse, ut nec cogitatione queat non 
esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic esse Deum, nequit eum non 
esse cogitare. (Anselm, Proslogion, Cap IV. Compare 
Yonologium, Cap. X.) 
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existence of God from His idea alone, he cannot suggest any way 
in which this can be effected. The direct and immediate 
assumption that 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' is 
understood secundum rem would assert that 'that than which a 
greater cannot be thought' is in reality - and this is precisely 
the point at issue. But failing this, it will have to be 
argued than 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' comes 
to be understood secundum rem because other realities necessitate 
it. And then. the ontological argument will have destroyed 
itself in becoming a cosmological argument. 
15. iii. The first line of Gaunilo's attack on Anselm's 
ontological argument has been to show that the attempt, to prove 
the existence of God from the idea of God alone fails, because 
such an idea, as it is divorced from, and yet seeks, reality, 
does not contain within itself any ground for the development 
demanded by the argument. In his other main line of attack, 
he effects a reductio ad absurdam of Anselm's argument on the 
assumption of its validity. 
Anselm argues that 'that than which a greater cannot 
be thought' must exist both in understanding and reality, because 
existence in both understanding and reality is greater than 
existence in reality alone, and must therefore belong to that 
which, by definition, is the greatest thinkable. Now, it seems 
that/ 
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that this same argument will apply not only to what is 
unconditionally the greatest thinkable, but also to what is the 
greatest thinkable of any class. If the existence of 'that than 
which nothing at all can be thought greater', can be established, 
as Anselm thinks, then similarly, it would seem, the existence of 
'that than which nothing of a given class can be thought greater', 
can be similarly established. And thus it would seem that we 
may parody and so disprove Anselm's argument by demonstrating, 
for example, the existence of an island than which a greater 
cannot be thought. 
Suppose that anyone disbelieves in an. island than 
which a greater cannot be thought, he at least understands what 
is meant by it. And what he understands is in his understanding. 
Thus, an island than which a greater cannot be thought is in his 
understanding. But it cannot merely be in his understandn.g, for 
then it would not be an island than which a greater cannot be 
thought, since a greater island could be thought. Thus, an 
island than which a greater cannot be thought exists both in 
understanding and in reality (1). 
Thus/ 
(1) Gaunilo: Liber pro Insipiente, Cap. VI. 
Gaunilo's argument is not so cogent as it is here 
represented to be. He again commits the mistake of 
supposing that the question at issue concerns that which 
is greater than all things, and hence parodies Anselm's 
argument in proving the existence of an island greater 
than all islands. To this extent he is open to correction 
by Anselm, but he can accept this correction without 
impairing the force of his argument. 
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Thus then, on Anselm's principles, it is possible to 
prove the existence of an island tuan which a greater cannot be 
thought, and similarly it would be possible to prove the 
existence of a chair, or table, or pen, than which a greater 
cannot be thought. But, it will be agreed, the existence of 
an island (or chair, or table, or pen) than which a greater 
cannot be thought cannot be proved in this way. Thus Anselm.'s 
principles, implying consequences which are false, must them- 
selves be false. And thus the ontological argument is disproved. 
In order that 'that than which a greater cannot be 
thought' may be proved to exist, it would have to be shown that 
it is demanded by those things than which a greater can be 
thought. Now, this cannot be done since there is no necessity 
attaching to the generating relation of the series, great, 
greater, greatest. Granted that X is a greater thinkable than 
Y, yet there is no necessity to grant X when you have granted Y. 
On the other hand, if it is assumed thatthere is necessity here 
so that you must acknowledge the existence of 'that than which 
a greater cannot be thought', then, Gaunilo points out, you will 
have to acknowledge similarly the existence of an island than 
which a greater - cannot be thought. 
Even if'that than which a greater cannot be thought' 
has been proved to exist because it is demanded by those things 
than which a greater can be thought (and that is the only way 
it can be proved), yet even then the existence of God has not 
been/ 
been proved. It is not enough, as Anselm realised in his 
cosmological argument, to exhibit God as being more valuable 
than anything else, nor is it enough to exhibit Him as that than 
which a more valuable cannot be thought. Besides this, you must 
show Him as that on which all other things depend - as that which 
alone is real and through which whatever else is real receives 
its reality. It is not enough for God to exist side by side 
with His creatures separated from them only by a degree of 
greatness. He must be shown further as the creator and 
sustainer of these other things. Whatever greatness may mean 
(t), it cannot include a reference to the dependence of what 
is less great on what is more great, unless that has been 
expressly provided for. And that has not been provided for 
by Anselm. Thus is is necessary to supplement the ontological 
argument, which proves the existence of 'that than which a 
greater cannot be thought', by another argument which provides 
for a difference in status between 'that than which a greater 
cannot be thought' and the things among which it exists. This 
Anseim provides in the Proslogion by a proof that 'that than 
which a greater cannot be thought' not only is, but cannot be 
thought not to be. And it is by this elaboration of his 
ontological argument that he attempts in the Liber Apologeticus 
to meet Gaunilo's reductio ad absurdam of the argument, which 
proceeds! 
(t) The only elucidation of the term given by Anselm is 
in the Monologium: "Dico autem non magnum spa$tio, ut est 
corpus aliquod; sed quad quanto majus: tanto melius est aut 
dignius. ut est sapienta." (Cap. II). 
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proceeds on the supposition that the difference between 'that 
than which a greater cannot be thought' and other things is 
simply a difference of thinkable greatness, and hence is the 
same as the difference which holds between an island than which 
a greater cannot be thought, and an island than which a greater 
can be thought. 
In the Proslogion Anselm argues: Something which 
cannot be thought not to be, can be thought to be. And this 
is greater than what can be thought not to be. Thus 'that than 
which a greater cannot be thought' must be that which cannot be 
thought not to be, since otherwise it would not be that than 
which a greater cannot be thought. Thus 'that than which a 
greater cannot be thought' is so truly that it cannot be thought 
not to be, and therefore it is to a greater extent than all 
other things, since whatever else is, is not so truly, and so 
has less being (1). 
Thus, in place of advancing from appearances to an 
absolute/ 
747 (1)* Quod id quo majus cogitari non valet Utique sic vere 
est, ut nec cogitaripossit non esse. Nam potest cogitari 
esse aliquid quod non posait cogitari non esse; quad n. jus 
est, quam quod non esse cogitari potest. Quare si id, quo 
quo majus nequit cogitari, potest cogitari non esse: idipsum 
quo majus cogitari nequit, non est id quo majus cogitari 
nequit: quod convenere non potest. Sic ergo vere est aliquid 
quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari posait non esse: 
et hoc es tu, Domine Deus noster. Sic ergo vere es, Domine, 
Deus meus, ut nec cogitari posais non esse; et merito. Si 
enim cliqua mens posset cogitare aliquid melius te, ascender 
creatura super Creatorem, et judicaret de Creatore: quod valicele 
est absurdum. Et quidem quidquid est aliud praeter solum te, 
potest cogitari non esse. Solus igitur verissime omnium, et 
ideo maxime omnium habes esse; quia quidquid alius est, non sic 
vere/ 
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absolute reality along a dependence series, as well as along a 
value series (see Paragraph 11), Anselm supplements his proof 
of the existence of 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' 
by a proof of its necessary existence. Since the absolute 
reality has not yet been specified in the proof of its existence 
jig the absolute reality which accounts for all appearances, it 
is sought to give it that status among appearances by showing 
that it has so much more being than other things that it cannot 
be thought not to be, while anything else can. 
But then, as Gaunilo's reduc.tio ad absurdam shows, if 
this qualification of the existence of 'that than which a greater 
cannot be thought' is subsequent to the establishment of its 
existence, then it will not save that existence from attacks 
which are based on the supposition that there is no difference 
between its existence and. that of other things. The proor that 
'that than which a greater cannot be thought' cannot be thought 
not to be must not be other than the proof that it is. Thus, 
in his reply to Gaunilo, where he is constantly pre -occupied 
with Gaunilo's island argument (1), Anselm is far more concerned 
with formulating a new ontological argument proving directly that 
'that than which a greater cannot be thought' cannot be thought 
not to be, than with defending his old ontological argument that 
it is. Thus in the Liber Apologeticus the argument which in the 
Proslogion/ 
vere est, et idcirco minus habet esse. (Anselm, Eroslogion 
Cap. III). 
(1) Liber Apologeticus, Cap, I, III, V. 
Proslogion had been merely a specification of the existence 
(previously proved) of 'that than which a greater cannot be 
thought', becomes the proof itself of that existence. 
The ontological argument, as thus re- formulated, 
becomes: 
All those things which have beginning or end, and 
all those things which are not as wholes at any place or at 
any time, can be thought not to be (1). 
But beyond those things which can be thought not to 
be, we can think something which cannot be thought not to be, 
and this is greater than those things whicn can be thought not to 
be (2). 
(1) Procul dubio quidquid alicubi aut aliquando non 
est, etiamsi est alicubi aut aliquandi; potest tarnen 
cogitari nunquam et nusquam esse, sicut non est alicubi 
aut aliquando. Nam quod heri non fuit, et hodie est: 
sicut heri non fuisse intelligitur; ita nunquam esse 
subintelligi potest: et quod hic non est, et alibi est, 
sicut non est hic, ita potest cogitari nusquam esse. 
Similiter cujus partes singulae non sunt ubi aut quando 
sunt aliae partes ejus; omnes partes, et ideo ipsum totum, 
possunt cogitari nunquam aut nusquam esse. Nam etsi dica +r 
tempus semper esse, et mundus ubique; non tarnen illud totum 
semper, aut iste totus est ubique: et sicut singulae partes 
temporis non stnü, quando aliae sunt; ita possunt nunquam 
esse cogitari; et singulae mundi partes, sicut non sunt ubi 
aliae sunt; ita subintelligi possunt nusquam esse: sed et 
quod partibus conjunctum est, cogitatione dissolvi, et 
non esse potest. Quare quidquid alicubi aut aliquando 
totum non est, etiamsi est, potest cogitari non esse. 
(I,ibel Apologe deus, Cap. I.) . 
(2) Ibid, Cap. I, IV, IX. 
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Therefore 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' 
is what cannot be thought not to be: 
(a) It cannot be thought except without beginning and end, 
but whatever can be thought to be and is not, can be thought to 
have beginning and end. Therefore it cannot be thought not to 
be (1). 
(b) If it could be thought not to be, is would not be 
'that than which a greater cannot be thought'. Therefore it 
cannot not -be (2). 
(e) Suppose that it is not. Then if it were, it would. not 
be 'that than which a greater cannot be thought'. Therefore it 
cannot not -be (3). 
In this exposition of the distinction between what can 
and what cannot be thought not to be, the basis is the single 
.thing, and the criterion is its bare presence or absence. When 
then, it is decided that anything is not what cannot be thought 
not to be, the negation involved is not particularised and 
grounded, but abstract and immediate. And the nature of this 
negation is necessitated by the purpose and pre -supposition of 
Anselm's argument. Since God is to be proved to be through 
Himself alone, things must be considered in isolation, and their 
necessary or their accidental being can be found only in tiemseIve . 
It/ 
(1) Anselm, Liber Apologeticus, Cap. I, III 
(2) Ibid, Cap. I, V. 
(3) Ibid, Cap. I, V. 
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It cannot be a product of mediation; it must be immediate, and 
so abstract. 
A thing, then, cannot be thought not to be only so 
long as it is immediately presented, whenever and wherever one 
chooses to look. The only necessity Anselm recognises in a 
thing is thus the unmediated existence which makes a thing appear 
whenever and wherever it is sought. A thing thus has being 
first in proportion to the amount of space that it fills and the 
amount of time that it occupies. And,secon.dly,it has being in 
proportion to its inaivisibility into parts. Things that are 
composed of parts cannot be said. to have more being than their 
parts, since the whole is the sum of their parts. But each 
part of a thing has less being than the whole of which it is a 
part, since it is not where and when the other parts of the 
thing are. Thus, the being of anything will decrease as it is 
split into parts and tnese parts into other parts, and so on. 
Then, since no limit can be placed. to this process of analysis, 
so no limit dan be placed to a thing's loss of being on analysis. 
Thus, even the wholes of space and time (space and time themselves 
are lacking in reality, since neither is as a whole everywhere 
and always. 
Everything, then, which is not as a whole everywhere 
and always can be thought not to be. And thus the assertion 
that 'that than which a greater cannot be thought' is what 
cannot be thought not to be is the assertion that it is a whole 
indivisible/ 
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indivisible into parts, which is everywhere and always. 
But, granting that this identification of 'that than 
which a greater cannot be thought' and the indivisible whole which 
is always and everywhere, has been made out, yet still this 
cannot be regarded as a proof of the existence of 'that than which 
a greater cannot be thought, unless it has been previously proved 
that an indivisible whole, present always and everywhere, exists. 
But no such proof, nor any suggestion of such a proof, is given 
by Anselm. And it is impossible for any such proof to be given. 
The indivisible whole which is always and everywhere, though it 
is what cannot be thought not to be, is yet stated, and can only 
be stated, as what can be thought to be. And the statement 
that what cannot be thought not to be can be thought to be, is 
certainly not equivalent to the statement that IA is, since the 
criterion of thought (as it is differentiated from understanding) 
is expressly asserted by Anselm to be other than the criterion 
of existence. (See page 73). 
But, failing any proof that what cannot be thought not t 
be exists, its identification with 'that than which a greater can- 
not be thought' can be regarded only as a specification of its 
existence after it has been proved to exist, and not as a proof 
of that existence itself. And that brings us back to the 
ontological argument of the Proslogion, which is open to the 
reductio ad absurdam of Gaunilo. 
Thus, you cannot prove the necessary existence of 
'that/ 
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'that than which a greater cannot be thought' either after or at 
the same time, as you prove its existence. If you attempt to 
prove its necessary existence after you have proved its existence, 
your proof of its existence, failing at the same time to prove 
its necessary existence, will be open to attacks which regard 
its existence as of the same kind as that of other things. 
And if you attempt to prove its necessary existence at the same 
time as its existence, you have to pre -suppose the existence or 
a necessary existent, so that its identification with the 
necessary existent may be regarded as a proof of its existence. 
And you cannot do this, because the idea or a necessary existent 
has been constructed by a thought which, by definition, is 
divorced from existence. 
Anselm has to add necessity to the . existence at 'that 
than which a greater cannot be thought' in order to lift it out 
of the ruck of those things than which a greater can be taou4it. 
And he has to lift it above these things because he will not, 
and cannot, show it in its place among them. It is true, as 
Anselm realises between the Proslogion and the Liber Apologeticus, 
that a proof of existence cannot be other than a proof of necessar 
existence. But Anselm cannot prove necessity along with 
existence, because he regards a proof of existence as other than 
an establishment of nature. The demonstration that a thing is 
necessarily is simply a demonstration that it is. But the 
demonstration that it is, is the demons ration at the same time 
of/ 
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of what it is. It is what is demanded at a certain point in a 
certain contexte If, from the beginning, you taxe into 
consideration the other things among which anything is to be, 
you do not have to lift it above these things by attributing 
to it a greater degree of being than you attribute to them. You 
will not need to insist, as Anselm does against Gaunilo (1), 
that your proof applies only to the tning you are considering 
because its being is unique. You will obtain uniqueness far 
what you are proving so that your proof cnnot be parodied, as 
Anselm'c: can, because the position the thing occupies in its 
context is unique. It will be unique in its relations, and 
hence in its nature, and so you will not need uniqueness for its 
being. Or rather, you will have provided uniqueness of being 
in. obtaining uniqueness of relations to other things, since a 
thing', being is its relations to other things. And a 
demonstration of its being, or of its necessary being (whichever 
you please), is a demonstration that a thing in these relations 
to other things is required by these other things. 
In the ontological argument, you have to prove the 
being and the necessity of God, as in the cosmological argument 
you/ 
(1) Fidens loquor; quia si quis invenerit mihi aliquid 
aut reipsa, aut sola cogitatione existens, praeter quo majus 
cogitari non possit, cui aptare valeat conr_exionem hujus 
meae argumentationis, inveniam, et labo illi perditam 
insulam àmplius non perdendam. (Liber Apologeticus, Cap. III). 
you have to prove Him as the final term of a value series and 
also as the final term of a dependent series. And you have to 
prove these separately because you have to prove identity and 
difference between God and His creatures separately. And that 
follows from the fact that what you are trying to prove is an 
absolute reality which cannot be spcified by the things among 
which it is placed, because they are its mere appearances. 
Since it is impossible to attribute any reality to the appear-. 
ances of the absolute reality outside the absolute reality, and 
hence, since it is impossible to prove an absolute reality by a 
demonstration that it is demanded by its appearances, it is 
necessary to demonstrate the absolute reality in another world 
than that in which the appearances exist. Thus Anselm attempts 
to construct a world where the principles of 'thought' hold, 
alongside a world where the principles of 'understanding' hold. 
But it is impossible permanently to maintain two worlds existing 
alongside, ana yet externally, to each other. And that is 
never Anselm's intention. He goes out of the world of 
understanding to find an absolute reality, to come back to the 
world of understanding witn it. But since he has found his 
absolute reality only in the world of thought which is outside 
understanding, he cannot bring it back into the world of 
understanding. The world of understanding admits only what has 
been specified, and thus demonstrated to be, within its own border 
The/ 
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The ontological argument does not fail because of any 
discontinuity between thought (which is understanding) and 
actuality, so that it may be asserted that what we cannot but 
think may be other than what is. It fails because it recognises 
two kinds of thought: that which, being from first to last in 
touch with actuality, regard.s implication as consisting in the 
actual connection of actualities; and that which acknowledges 
implications other tnan the relations between actualities, and 
then, starting with the first, attempts to advance from that to 
the second. Unless you regard thought from the beginning as of 
actuality, and hence acknowledge no implications which are not 
actually relations between actualities, you cannot advance to 
thought of actuality, since you can never justify the 
implications by which you advance from the one thought to the 
other as actual. 
Thus, the alternative to the ontological argument is 
not scepticism, as some Idealists would have us believe. It is 
a belief in thought as one and indivisible - as always of reality. 
Scepticism would be the alternative to the ontological argument 
only if we began from thought which is not of actuality, and then 
had to bridge the gap between thought and actuality by the 
ontological argument. But no bridge is necessary, because there 
is no gap. And, on the other hand, if there were any gap, it 
would be impossible to bridge it. 
Note/ 
Note: The ontological arguments of Descartes and Spinoza 
show no advance on the ontological argument of Anselm, and the 
principles already elucidated to cover Anselm's argument also 
account for, and at the same time refute, the arguments of 
Descartes and Spinoza. And_ it is Anselm's argument, and not 
those of Descartes and Spinoza, which has been responsible for 
the re- emergence of the ontological argument in contemporary 
Idealism, since it was to Anselm's argument that Hegel turned 
after Kant had successfully attacked that which has descended 
from Descartes, through Leibnitz and Wolff. In considering 
the arguments of Descartes and Spinoza, I shall therefore re- 
strict myself to noting the identity between their arguments and 
Anselm's, the divergencies they attempt, and the superficial 
fallacies that they contain. 
Descartes differentiates his ontological argument from 
that of Anselm through Thomas' criticism of Anselm which Caterus 
urges against him (1). 
Following Thomas, Caterus argues: Even if it be 
granted that a supremely perfect being implies existence by its 
very/ 
(1) TT ... dato quod ab omnibus per hoc nomen, Deus, 
intelligatur aliquid quo majus cogit ari non possit, non 
necesse erit aliquid esse quo majus cogitari non potest in 
rerum natura. Eodem enim modo necesse est poni rem et 
nominis rationem. Ex hoc autem quod mente concipitur quod 
profertur hoc nomine, Deus, non sequitur Deum esse, nisi in 
intellectu. Unde nec oportebit id, quo majus cogitari non 
potestI 
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very name, it does not follow that that existence is actual,but 
only that the concept of existence is inseparably joined to the 
concept of a supreme being. Thus, you cannot infer that the 
existence or God is actual unless you have pre -supposed that 
that supreme being actually exists, for then, and only then., will 
it actually contain all perfections and thus that of real 
existence. 
And he illustrates his contention by considering the 
complex: 12.o e_x_ísteus. This includes essentially both lion and 
existence. And hence the clear and distinct idea that God has 
of it essentially involves its existence. But nevertheless, 
the distinct knowledge whicn God has of that complex does not 
constrain either part of it to be, unless it is assumed than the 
whole complex is, for then and only then will it involve all its 
essential perfections, and hence also actual existence (1). 
And, on the other hand, Caterus might have added, as 
did Gaunilo, if the fact that existence is contained in the 
supremely/ 
potest, esse nisi in intellectu; et ex hoc non sequitur 
quod sit aliquid in rerum natura, quo majus cogi -ari non 
possit. Et sic nullum inconveniens accidit ponentibus Perm 
non esse. Non enim inconveniens est, Quolibet dato vel in Ye, 
vel in intellectu, aliquid majus cogitari posse, nisi ei qui 
concedit esse aliquid, quo majus cogitari non possit in rerum 
natura." (Thomas; Summa contra Gentiles, Lib.I, Cap.XI). 
(1) Primae Objectiones. 
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supremely perfect is a proof that the supremely perfect exists, 
so the fact that existence is contained in the complex, existent 
lion, or existent unicorn, .will be a proof also that a lion exists, 
or that a unicorn exists. But, it will be agreed, a lion or 
a unicorn cannot be proved to exist in this way. Therefore 
neither can the supremely perfect. 
Descartes accepts Thomas', and hence Caterus', criticism 
of Anselm' s ontological argument, but denies it of his own. He 
agrees that the only conclusion to be drawn from Anselm's 
ontological argument is: TT ergointellecto uid significet hoc 
nomen Deus, intelljitur sï c ri Deum esse in re et 
intel1ectu." and that this is insufficient for the conclusion: 
"existît ero rocul dubio .17 uid uo me . coo- .r' x .. alet, 
et in intellectu et in re." But, he says, his own argument is 
different: 
What we clearly and distinctly understand to belong to 
the true and immutable nature, or essence, or form, of anything 
can be truly affirmed of that thing. 
But after we have sufficiently accurately investigated 
what God is, we clearly and distinctly Wziderstand that it belongs 
to His true and immutable nature to exist. 
Therefore, we can truly affirm of God that He exists (1). 
Thus Descartes differentiates his ontological argument 
from/ 
(1) Primae Responsiones. 
-122_ 
from Anselm's because he considers the true and immutable nature 
of God, whereas Anselm considers only the meaning of the term, God. 
And to support this contention, he brings forward a general 
criterion by which we may know when we have obtained ideas of true 
and immutable natures, and when we have not. Those ideas, he 
says, which do not contain true and immutable natures but only 
fictitious natures constructed by the understanding, can be 
divided by the understanding, not only through abstraction, but 
through a clear and distinct operation. Hence any idea which 
the understanding cannot divide cannot have been constructed by 
it, and so must be the idea of a true and immutable nature. Now, 
when we think 'winged horse' or 'lion actually existing' or 
'triangle inscribed in square', we easily understand that we can, 
on the contrary,thïnk 'horse not winged', or 'lion not existing', 
or 'triangle without square'. Therefore these ideas are not of 
true and immutable natures. But if, on the other hand, we think 
'triangle', or 'square', then certainly whatever we discern to be 
contained in 'trianrle',(e.g. that its three angles are equal to 
two right- angles) we can truly affirm of all triangles. And, 
similarly, whatever we can clearly and distinctly discern to be 
contained in the idea of 'square', we can truly affirm of square. 
For although we can understand 'triangle' in abstraction from the 
fact that its .three angles are equal to two right- angles, we 




Now if we enquire about that which has all those 
perfections which can be together, we shall see that it exists 
necessarily in exactly the same way as the three angles or a 
triangle are necessarily equal to two right- angles. For, in 
the first place, we clearly and distinctly perceive that possible 
existence, at least, is predicable of it as it is of all things 
which we distinctly perceive, even those which are put together 
by the understanding. And then, because we cannot think that 
its existence is possible without, at the sage time, recognising 
that it can exist by its own force, we therefore conclude that 
it really exists, and from eternity has existed, for it is 
evident that what can exist by its own power always does exist. 
Thus we understand that existence is contained in the idea of a 
supremely powerful being, not through a figment of the understand- 
ing, but because it pertains to the true and immutable nature of 
such a being to exist.(1). 
Thus Descartes asserts that his ontological argument 
proceeds secundum rem, while Anselm's proceeds secundum voces. 
Now, it has been argued (Paragraph 14.), this contention can only 
be justified either by assuming that God is a reality, or by 
proving that He is a reality because He is demanded by other 
realities, so that the ontological argument will become either a 
etitio princiDii or a cosmological argument. But Descartes 
asserts/ 
(1) Ibid. 
asserts a third way of justifying this contention. An idea, he 
says, is of a true and immutable nature (secundum rem) , and not 
merely a fiction constructed by the mind (secundum voces), if 
it cannot be divided. All fictitious ideas are divisible, and 
therefore no non -divisible ideas are fictitious. And he suggests 
that he is going to prove that his idea of God is the idea of a 
true and immutable nature by proving that it is not divisible. 
But in fact he makes no attempt to prove this. Instead 
he argues: Possible existence is predicable of the idea of God, 
as it is of all distinct ideas. But when we acknowledge God's 
existence as possible, we must, at trie same time, acknowledge 
that He can exist by His own power. And then it follows that 
He always exists. 
And it is only now, after the supremely perfect has 
been proved to exist, that Descartes concludes that the idea of 
the supremely perfect is that of a true and immutable nature, and 
not a mere fiction. Thus Descartes has abandonned the attempt 
to prove that his idea of God is not divisible, so that he may 
then assert that it is the idea of a true and immutable nature (1). 
And, instead, he argues, as Anselm does in the Liber Apologeticus: 
God can be thought to be. When He is thought to be, He must be 
thought/ 
(1) Why the fact that an idea is indivisible should be 
taken to prove that it is the idea of a true and immutable 
na -ture, it is difficult to conjecture. But since Descartes 
cannot prove that the idea of the supremely perfect (or, 
indeed, any other idea) is indivisible, it is unnecessary to 
discuss this point. 
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thought as what cannot be thought not to be. Therefore God 
cannot be thought not to be. 
Descartes' argument has followed the same course as 
Anselm's, with Caterus following Thomas playing the part of 
Gaunilo. In the Discours and the Meditationes he began by 
arguing: 
If I have an idea of anything, whatever I clearly and. 
distinctly perceive to belong to that thing does belong to it. 
I have an idea of God, that is of a being supremely perfect. 
n I clearly and distinctly perceive that existence belongs to 
it. since existence is a perfection. Therefore existence belongs 
to God. And it belongs to God alone, since only in the case of 
a supremely perfect being can existence and essence not be 
separated. 
Then, under the spur of Caterus' objections, he has 
radically to alter this argument to that it appears in the form 
assumed throughout his Responsiones and in the Principi On 
the one hand, in order to get beyond idea into existence, he 
states a general connection between idea and existence. And 
then, on the other hand, in order to differentiate the existence 
of God from that of all other things, he distinguishes between 
necessary and possible existence. Thus the ontological argument 
now isneither a simple analysis of the idea of the supremely 
perfect, nor does it hold except in the case of the supremely 
perfect. It is a particular and unique instance of the general 
reference/ 
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reference to reality present in any idea. Descartes is on the 
road to Bradley's formulation of the argument, and what has beer. 
said (Paragraph 13) in regard to Bradley applies also to Descartes. 
Spinoza's arguments for the existence of God (Ethices, 
Pars.I, Prop. 11) fall into two groups. The first tries to 
prove God through his definition simply as substance (id Quod in 
se est et per se concipitur), and it involves a non sequitur of 
exactly the same kind as is involved in Anselm's second proof 
in the Liber Apologeticus. The second tries to prove God 
through his definition as an absolutely infinite substance, and . 
it reduces to an identical proposition. 
The first proof: Suppose God does not exist, then 
since the essence of that which can be conceived as non existing, 
does not involve existence (Ax. 7), God's essence will not 
involve existence. But it belongs to substance to exist because, 
since substance cannot be produced by another, it must be the 
cause of itself, and so its essence involves existence (Prop. 7). 
And God is a substance. Therefore God's essence involves 
existence, and so He cannot be supposed not to exist. 
This proof is a re-statement of the proof of 
Proposition 7: Substance is that which is in itself (Def. 3). 
therefore it cannot be . produced by another (Prop. 5. cor.). 
Hence it will be its own cause an a so it must exist. 
And this is simply a non sequitur. Because substance 
does/ 
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does not exist through another, and so if it does exist must 
exist through itself, it does not follow that it does exist. 
The second proof: The alternative proofs depend on 
the argument in the Scholium: To be able to exist is power. 
Therefore the more reality is contained in the nature of anything, 
the more force it will have to exist. Hence, since God is as 
absolutely infinite being, He will have absolute power of 
existing, and therefore will exist absolutely. 
Posse exister_g_otentia eft seems to be true only if 
it is an identical proposition, when, that is, it means, 
posse existere potentia existendi est. If it is not an 
identical proposition, the potentiA which is oosse existere 
needs to be specified and to be proved to be posse existere. 
And it seems to be impossible to prove that any power othe. than 
that of existence is, as a matter of fact, an ability to exist. 
Then, granting that God, the absolute infinite, is 
therefore the absolutely powerful, all that will be obtained 
will be an identical proposition: That which has absolute 
power of existing is absolutely able to exist. 
The second alternative is stated by Spinoza to be the 
a posteriori form of this argument: To be able not to exist is 
powerlessness, and to be able to exist is power. If, then, only 
finite beings now necessarily exist, then finite beings are more 
powerful than the absolutely infinite. But this is absurd. 
Therefore either nothing exists, or the absolutely infinite 
necessarily/ 
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necessarily exists. But nothing does not exist, because we 
exist either in ourselves or in another which exists necessarily. 
Therefore God, the absolutely infinite, exists. 
This argument admits of two interpretations: (1 ) 
Granted that something exists, the absolutely infinite must 
exist, because it is more able to exist than anything el e. 
(2) Granted that something exists necessarily, then the 
absolutely infinite exists, because it is more able to exist 
than anything else. But since Spinoza does not make it clear 
what necessario means here (it cannot, I sup_oose, be regarded 
as the adverb of necessarie, which seems to be defined in 
Def. 7 as the opposite of libera), it does not matter which 
interpretation is adopted. In either case the assertions of 
the relative ability to be of things or necessary things in 
relation to the absolutelÿ infinite will reduce to identical 
propositions. And it is impossible to assert that a thing is 
to a certain extent merely because it has been defined as what 
is able to be to a certain degree. 
The first alternative, too, depends for its cogency on 
the argument in the Scholium: A cause or reason ought to be 
given why anything exists, or why it does not exist. And if no 
reason or cause can be given why a thing should not exist, then 
it must be granted to exist. .Now, if any reason could be given 
why God should not exist, that must be either in Goa or in 
something other than God. And if it is in something other than 
God/ 
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God, that other must be of another nature than God. For 
otherwise it would be granted that God is. But a substance 
which is of another nature than God will have nothing in common 
with God (Prop. 2). And so it can neither. give Him existence, 
nor take existence from Him (Ax. 5). Since then, nothing out- 
side God, whether of the same or of a different nature, can 
prevent his existence, He must exist unless His own nature 
involves His non -existence. But this cannot be asserted of the 
absolutely infinite and the supremely perfect. Therefore God 
necessarily exists. 
This reduces to: Since God is substance, and substance 
is that which is in itself, therefore nothing other than God can 
prevent His existence. And since God is the absolutely infinite 
substance, nothing in God can prevent His existence. Therefore, 
since no reason either outside God or in God can be given why 
He does not exist, He must exist. 
By the first step this argument is related to the 
first proof. By the second step it is related to the second 
proof. ; Grant the first step, then the second depends on the 
conclusion in the Scholium. Nothing in the absolutely infinite 
can prevent its existence, because the absolutely infinite is the 
absolutely powerful, and the absolutely powerful is absolutely 
able to exist. But this proves nothing, since, as it has been 
pointed out, the only power which can be granted to confer ability 
to exist is precisely the power to exist, and thus this argument, 
along with the argument of the Scholium, is seen to be circular. 
